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Opportunity-Cost Conflicts in 
Corporate Law 
Abraham J.B. Cable† 
Abstract 
Delaware corporate law has a new brand of loyalty claim: the 
opportunity-cost conflict. Such a conflict arises when a fiduciary 
operates under strong incentives to withdraw human and financial 
capital for redeployment into new investment opportunities. The 
concept has its roots in venture capital investing, where board members 
affiliated with venture capital funds may have incentives to shut down 
viable start-ups in order to focus on more promising companies. 
Recognizing this type of conflict has conceptual value—it provides 
a coherent framework for assessing a fiduciary’s incentives, and it may 
help explain frequently criticized features of corporate fiduciary law. 
But this article argues that courts should invoke the doctrine sparingly 
to avoid upsetting the law’s current balance between policing 
managerial abuse and litigation abuse. 
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Introduction 
Assume you establish a corporation to operate a restaurant, and 
you are lucky enough to know Warren Buffet and Bill Gates.1 Imagine 
that (a) Buffet and Gates each loan the corporation $500,000 at a 
reasonable interest rate; (b) Buffet and Gates serve as officers and 
directors of the corporation; and (c) Buffet and Gates each receive 25.5 
percent of the corporation’s common stock as compensation for their 
service and advice. Assume the restaurant operates for five years with 
moderate success—enough to make the loan payments with only a small 
amount left over for shareholders. Now suppose you propose a new 
menu to boost profits, but Gates and Buffet decide their time and 
money could be put to better use elsewhere. They vote as board 
members to sell the restaurant for an amount that pays off the loans 
but leaves only a small amount for shareholders. Assuming Gates and 
Buffet obtained a good price for the restaurant at that time, have they 
violated their fiduciary duties to you because they turned their 
attention to other projects and denied you the chance to unveil your 
new menu? 
The Delaware Chancery Court recently suggested that the answer 
is yes by recognizing for the first time what this article refers to as an 
“opportunity-cost conflict.” This article argues that this novel fiduciary  
1. For an entertaining account of the Buffet and Gates friendship, see Drake 
Baer, How Bill Gates And Warren Buffett Overcame A Totally Awkward 
First Meeting To Become Best Friends, Business Insider (Oct. 1, 2014, 4:15 
PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/bill-gates-warren-buffett-friendship- 
2014-10 [http://perma.cc/87UD-ZT7X]. 
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principle is a double-edged sword: conceptually valuable but difficult to 
enforce without unsettling the law of corporate fiduciaries. 
An opportunity-cost conflict arises when corporate fiduciaries 
operate under strong incentives to withdraw human and financial cap-
ital for redeployment into new investment opportunities. This concept 
is rooted in the economic principle of opportunity cost—the cost of a 
course of action is the highest value alternative forsaken.2 It recognizes 
that a true understanding of a fiduciary’s incentives requires knowing 
the fiduciary’s alternatives to continued dealings with the beneficiary. 
Opportunity-cost conflicts are distinct from traditional duty of 
loyalty claims against corporate fiduciaries. Traditionally, such claims 
arise in two principal situations: (1) self-dealing between the fiduciary 
and the corporation to the detriment of the latter3 and (2) misappro-
priation by the fiduciary of a corporate opportunity.4 Unlike traditional 
self-dealing, a fiduciary with an opportunity-cost conflict does not enter 
into a transaction with the corporation—the fiduciary simply shuts 
down the business and withdraws. Unlike a fiduciary who misappro-
priates a corporate opportunity, a fiduciary with an opportunity-cost 
conflict does not pursue any business initiative that rightfully belongs 
to the corporation—the fiduciary simply abandons one corporation in 
order to focus on a more promising alternative. 
Not surprisingly, the concept of opportunity-cost conflicts was born 
in the context of venture capital investing. Venture capital funds take 
an unusually active role in the start-ups in which they invest.5 This 
hands-on approach requires venture capitalists to allocate their scarce 
time among portfolio companies.6 In this setting, continued investment 
in a moderately promising start-up company may have a high oppor-
tunity cost for the venture capitalist because it comes at the expense of 
spending additional time on more promising companies in the fund’s 
 
2. A common illustration of the concept is that there is “no free lunch” because 
time is scarce and attending lunch forecloses alternative uses of time. E.g., 
Russell Roberts, Getting the Most Out of Life: The Concept of Opportunity 
Cost, Library of Economics and Liberty (Feb. 5, 2007),  
http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2007/Robertsopportunitycost. 
html [http://perma.cc/T8HM-2FHH] (discussing the proverbial free lunch). 
3. See infra notes 33 and 175 (discussing claims based on self-dealing by a 
corporate director). 
4. E.g., Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.70 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2013) (imposing special 
procedural requirements on the pursuit of a business opportunity belonging to 
the corporation); Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148 (Del. 1996) 
(applying the corporate opportunities doctrine under Delaware law). 
5. See infra text accompanying notes 107-109 (discussing the active role that 
funds play in management decisions, and the decisions they face in 
allocating their time). 
6. See id. (discussing the limited time resources of venture capital funds). 
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portfolio.7 Indeed, commentators have long observed that venture 
capital funds may shut down viable companies in circumstances where 
company founders might prefer to forge ahead.8 One can anticipate 
similar dynamics in any setting where active investors must allocate 
their efforts among competing projects.9 
In the recent case of In re Trados Incorporated Shareholder 
Litigation10 (Trados), the Delaware Chancery Court expressly invoked 
this shutdown dynamic while enshrining opportunity-cost conflicts into 
law.11 The court held that start-up company board members affiliated 
with venture capital funds faced a conflict of interest when considering 
a merger that resulted in a payout to the funds, as preferred share-
holders, but no payout to common shareholders.12 Though an earlier 
opinion in the Trados litigation (Pretrial Trados)13 received significant 
scholarly attention for allowing such a claim to survive a motion to 
dismiss,14 only the most recent opinion, which has received less 
attention from scholars, fully articulates the court’s novel reasoning.15  
7. See id. 
8. See id. 
9. See infra text accompanying notes 113–114 (citing as possible examples: 
shareholders in a closely held corporation, activist hedge-fund investors, 
and parent corporations). 
10. 73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
11. Id. at 46–54. 
12. See id. at 54 (“[Three directors] were not independent with respect to the 
Merger. They wanted to exit, consistent with the interests of the VC firms 
they represented.”). 
13. In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 1512–CC, 2009 WL 2225958 (Del. 
Ch. July 24, 2009). 
14. E.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A Theory of Preferred 
Stock, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1815, 1874–1900 (2013) (discussing Pretrial 
Trados in articulating an over-arching “theory of preferred stock”); 
Charles R. Korsmo, Venture Capital and Preferred Stock, 78 Brook. L. 
Rev. 1163, 1165, 1185–89 (2013) (discussing Pretrial Trados as a basis 
for “reassess[ing] the law’s treatment of preferred stockholders in the 
venture capital context”); Simone M. Sepe, Intruders in the Boardroom: 
The Case of Constituency Directors, 91 Wash. U. L. Rev. 309, 314 n.12, 
320 (2013) (discussing Pretrial Trados in an economic analysis of 
constituency directors); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Poor Pitiful or Potently 
Powerful Preferred?, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2025, 2039 (2013) (discussing 
Pretrial Trados in a response to Bratton and Wachter). 
15. The trial court opinion has been cited in a handful of law review articles. 
Most notably, several prominent authors discussed the opinion in a recent 
symposium issue of the Seattle University Law Review. See Robert P. 
Bartlett III, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as Means to an End,  
38 Seattle U. L. Rev. 255, 290–95 (2015); Margaret Blair, Boards of 
Directors as Mediating Hierarchs, 38 Seattle U. L. Rev. 297, 330-34 (2015); 
Anthony J. Casey & M. Todd Henderson, The Boundaries of “Team” 
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Conceptually, Trados deserves credit for giving courts a coherent 
framework for identifying when a fiduciary’s incentives are in fact 
impaired. Though courts and commentators have long recognized that 
disparate payouts from a transaction can affect incentives,16 Trados 
reminds us that such cash flow rights are only part of the story. In the 
restaurant example above, Gates and Buffet may not have precisely the 
same financial incentives as you because only they receive a significant 
payout from transaction (repayment of their loans). But those payout 
differentials alone do not really answer the question of whether Gates 
and Buffet have materially different incentives than you. After all, they 
are also shareholders who would benefit from a wildly successful new 
menu, and they continue to receive interest payments on the loans as 
long as they are outstanding. What really puts you at odds with Buffet 
and Gates are their lucrative alternatives to your more pedestrian 
venture. 
Another conceptual strength of Trados’s new analysis is the light 
it sheds on contested normative questions regarding fiduciary duties, 
such as the vexing question of to whom director fiduciary duties should 
be owed. After deciding that the preferred and common shareholders in 
Trados had conflicting interests, the court determined that the board 
owed its fiduciary duty to the common shareholders alone (common 
maximization).17 Prominent commentators have instead argued that 
corporate directors should seek to maximize overall enterprise value 
(enterprise maximization) rather than common stock value alone, 
because a rule of enterprise maximization increases combined welfare.18 
Focusing on opportunity costs may inform this debate and explain the 
court’s choice of common maximization. For example, it is not clear 
that enterprise maximization is the right measure of combined welfare 
if it ignores gains from redeploying capital and effort to more promising 
 
Production of Corporate Governance, 38 Seattle U. L. Rev. 365, 383-86 
(2015); Elizabeth Pollman, Team Production Theory and Private Company 
Boards, 38 Seattle U. L. Rev. 619, 627-36 (2015). But these authors did not 
focus on the opportunity-cost reasoning that this article analyzes. 
16. See infra Part I.A (describing the relationship between incentive 
incompatibility and fiduciary duties). 
17. See In re Trados, 73 A.3d at 42 n.16 (“As long as a board complies with its 
legal obligations, the standard of fiduciary conduct calls for the board to 
maximize the value of the corporation for the benefit of the common stock.”). 
18. See Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other People’s Money, 60 Stan. 
L. Rev. 1309, 1323–28 (2008) (“[I]ndeed coupling firm-maximization with a 
broad business judgment rule may in fact be a sensible way to think about the 
problem . . . .”); see also Bratton & Wachter, supra note 14, at 1894 (“An 
enterprise value-maximization principle presents a much stronger case for 
fiduciary scrutiny with a more balanced tradeoff of costs and benefits.”). 
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opportunities.19 Moreover, if venture capital investors labor under 
pervasive opportunity-cost conflicts, a rule of common maximization 
may be necessary to induce entrepreneurs to fully commit to corporate 
ventures.20 
Despite these conceptual strengths, this article concludes that 
courts should interpret the doctrine of opportunity-cost conflicts 
narrowly. In Delaware corporate law, access to judicial process is 
conditioned on clear indicia of misconduct.21 This feature of fiduciary 
law seems to reflect a considered judgment that the societal cost of 
allowing meritless litigation to proceed exceeds the societal cost of 
letting some fiduciary indiscretions go unlitigated.22 Because oppor-
tunity-cost conflicts are nuanced, multilayered, and ubiquitous,23 allow-
ing liberal pursuit of such claims would upset the law’s current balance 
between policing litigation abuse and managerial misconduct. Thus, 
Trados serves as an example of how doctrine can be both “right” and 
impractical to implement except for in the most egregious cases. 
This replays a familiar dynamic in corporate law. Corporate law 
sometimes maintains lofty standards of conduct (what we ideally expect 
of a fiduciary) while evaluating individual cases under deferential stan-
dards of review (such as the business judgment rule) that decline 
rigorous judicial enforcement.24 In other words, a court may announce 
an important principle based on unusually vivid evidence in a particular 
case, but the principle may not be worth actively policing in the ord-
inary case. A well-known example is the famous dispute between Henry 
Ford and shareholders of Ford Motor Company in which shareholders 
objected to Ford’s expansion plans and curtailment of dividends on the 
basis that he was operating the company based on social rather than 
 
19. See infra Part II.B.1 (suggesting the rule of enterprise value is too atomistic). 
20. See infra Part II.B.2 (suggesting a plausible explanation for why a rule of 
common maximization is necessary to induce entrepreneurs to enter into 
venture capital bargains). 
21. See infra Part III.A (discussing how standard of review in Delaware reserves 
judicial process for those instances in which the court’s interest in policing 
managerial misconduct outweighs its interest in policing litigation abuse). 
22. See infra Part III.A (providing an overview of empirical research and 
commentary regarding strike suits in shareholder litigation). 
23. See infra Part II.A (identifying the many layers of information necessary 
to understand a party’s opportunity costs); infra Part III (arguing that 
opportunity cost conflicts are ubiquitous in the sense that investors will 
frequently have better options (regrets) and therefore an incentive to 
redeploy capital and efforts into new projects). 
24. See infra text accompanying note 173 (discussing diverging standards of 
review and standards of conduct). 
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financial goals.25 Ford lost the case because he stubbornly insisted that 
he operated the company without regard to earning profits for 
shareholders.26 Although the case remains good law and does conceptual 
work in the classroom (where it frequently introduces students to the 
corporate law norm of shareholder primacy),27 courts have generally 
declined to enforce the principle vigorously.28 Likewise, Trados is an 
important case, but one that should be invoked sparingly. 
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the importance 
of incentive structures in fiduciary law, the conceptual difficulties posed 
by the incentive structures of venture capital investors, and Trados’s 
approach to addressing those difficulties. Part II identifies conceptual 
strengths in the court’s framework of opportunity-cost conflicts, 
includeing its sound footing in models of economic decision-making and 
its implications for normative debate about the form and content of 
corporate fiduciary duties. Having acknowledged these strengths, this 
article advocates in Part III for a narrow reading of the case based on 
concerns that litigation is an inefficient mechanism for enforcing the 
duties Trados defines. Part IV anticipates and responds to potential 
objections. 
I. A Novel Solution to the Problem of  
Quasi-Residual Claimants 
This Part frames the problem that Trados sought to solve. In short, 
holders of traditional preferred stock have materially different 
incentives than holders of common stock, which may call into question 
whether a fiduciary associated with a preferred holder will discharge 
duties owed to common holders. But venture capital investors do not 
receive traditional preferred stock, making it difficult to discern their 
incentives. Trados offers a solution to this incentive ambiguity. 
 
25. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 671 (Mich. 1919) (quoting 
testimony of Henry Ford). 
26. See id. at 684 (“A business corporation is organized and carried on 
primarily for the profit of the stockholders.”). 
27. See D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. Corp. L. 
277, 315 (1998) (describing the case as “[t]he most quoted—at least by 
academics—statement of the shareholder primacy norm” and noting its 
prevalence in law school curriculums). 
28. See id. at 286–88 (asserting that the business judgment rule makes the 
shareholder primacy norm “virtually unenforceable” in the context of 
publicly traded companies). Smith argues that the shareholder primacy 
norm evolved into the modern doctrine of minority oppression in the 
context of privately held corporations. Id. at 279. 
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A. Loyalty and Incentive Incompatibility 
The fiduciary duty of loyalty can be thought of as a collection of 
component obligations, each being more or less relevant in a particular 
context. Examples of such component obligations include: honesty and 
full disclosure to the beneficiary29 (“honesty”), using the beneficiary’s 
property only for the benefit of the beneficiary rather than the 
fiduciary30 (“no misappropriation”), and giving the expected amount of 
effort in advancing the beneficiary’s interests31 (“full effort”). These 
obligations may sound in moral or economic theory.32 In corporate law, 
courts enforce the duty of loyalty by more intensely policing fact pat-
terns that seem likely to implicate one or more of the component loyalty 
obligations. For example, courts apply the exacting fairness standard, 
instead of the deferential business judgment rule, whenever a corporate 
director engages in self-dealing by entering into a contract with the 
corporation.33 
 
29. See Philosophical Foundations of Fiduciary Law 180–81 (Andrew 
S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014) [hereinafter Foundations of 
Fiduciary Law] (discussing situations in which loyalty includes an 
obligation of “being true”). 
30.  E.g., Unif. P’ship Act § 404 6 U.L.A. 143 (1997) (requiring a partner to 
“account to the partnership and hold as trustee for it any property, profit, 
or benefit derived by the partner in the conduct and winding up of the 
partnership business”). Gordon Smith describes the core obligation of loyalty 
in similar terms but uses the expanded concept of a “critical resource” 
instead of property. D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of 
Fiduciary Duty, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 1399, 1407 (2002) (“[A] wrong is 
committed in the fiduciary context when the fiduciary does or has something 
that is inconsistent with the beneficiary’s interest in the critical resource.”). 
31.  See Foundations of Fiduciary Law, supra note 29, at 179–80 (discussing 
situations in which loyalty includes an obligation of “affirmative devotion”); 
Lyman Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse in Corporate 
Law, 28 Del. J. Corp. L. 27, 37–42 (2003) (identifying a notion of loyalty 
requiring the fiduciary to affirmatively advance the beneficiary’s interests); 
Sepe, supra note 14, at 319 (discussing the economic concept of “insufficient 
effort” and relating the concept to fiduciary duty law). 
32. See Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary 
Obligation, 1988 Duke L.J. 879, 889–92 (1988) (discussing the disconnect 
between traditional law and economics analyses of fiduciary duties and 
the moral tone of judicial opinions delineating these rights). 
33. See Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.61 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2013) (requiring that 
a “director’s conflicting interest transaction” (1) be approved by independent 
directors or shareholders or (2) be fair to the corporation); Del. Code Ann. 
tit. 8, § 144 (2015) (requiring that a self-dealing transaction be fair to the 
corporation or subject to special approval procedures). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 1·2015 
Opportunity-Cost Conflicts in Corporate Law 
59 
In some circumstances, it is difficult to identify precisely why a 
particular claim lies in loyalty rather than the duty of care.34 On the 
one hand, betrayal by a fiduciary through misappropriation or 
deception clearly enough offends ethical or moral sensibilities. Perhaps, 
not surprisingly then, the obligations of honesty and no misapprop-
riation likely form the core of the duty of loyalty.35 In contrast, the 
obligation of full effort has been less prominent in loyalty jurisprudence, 
perhaps because offending conduct resembles a less culpable negligence 
claim.36 In some cases, a fact pattern implicates loyalty only as a matter 
of degree—consequences of impaired effort are particularly severe in a 
particular setting,37 conduct is particularly egregious or intentional,38 
lapses are particularly likely because incentive structures are noticeably 
impaired,39 or violations are particularly easy to police because they are 
easy to identify.40 
 
34. See Johnson, supra note 31, at 37–42 (discussing overlap between care 
and loyalty concepts); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. 
Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 103 
(1991) (“[T]here is no sharp line between the duty of care and the duty 
of loyalty. What is the difference between working less hard than 
promised at a given level of compensation (a breach of the duty of 
care) and being compensated more than promised at a given level of 
work (a breach of the duty of loyalty)?”). 
35. See Johnson, supra note 31, at 37–42 (discussing a minimum condition of 
loyalty (non-betrayal) and a “maximum condition” of loyalty (affirmatively 
advancing the beneficiary’s interests)). 
36. See id. Prior to the court’s decision in Stone v. Ritter, 911 A. 2d 362 (Del. 
2006), it may not have been clear under Delaware law that extreme non-
feasance constitutes a breach of loyalty rather than care or a separate 
duty of good faith. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 369-70. 
37. For example, Delaware courts may scrutinize sale transactions that 
constitute an “end-game” for shareholders. See In re Smurfit-Stone 
Container Corp., No. 6164–VCP, 2011 WL 2028076, at *15 (Del. Ch. May 
20, 2011) (explaining circumstances triggering scrutiny under the Revlon 
standard). In extreme cases, a failure to obtain the best price for share-
holders in such a transaction constitutes a duty of loyalty claim. See 
Stephen Bainbridge, The Geography of Revlon-Land, 81 Fordham L. 
Rev. 3277, 3314–3320 (2013) (discussing circumstances in which Revlon 
claims implicate the duty of loyalty). 
38. E.g., Stone, 911 A.2d at 369–70 (holding that insufficient director 
oversight might constitute a breach of loyalty in cases of “utter failure” 
or “conscious disregard”). 
39. See infra notes 41–50 (discussing impaired incentives in the context of 
self-dealing and capital structures with fixed and residual claimants). 
40. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 34, at 103 (“It is . . . easier for 
courts to detect appropriations than to detect negligence, so the costs of 
inquiry and error are lower.”). 
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For example, courts might closely police self-dealing because it 
severely impairs a director’s incentives to give full effort in protecting 
the corporation’s interests with respect to the subject matter of the self-
dealing.41 Though a fiduciary may act benevolently towards his or her 
beneficiary in such a situation, a self-dealing transaction has an 
undeniable distributional aspect. With respect to many basic terms of 
a transaction—price, for example—the fiduciary’s gain will be the 
corporation’s loss.42 When a director engages in self-dealing, he or she 
does not necessarily violate his or her fiduciary duty. But experience 
warns that breaches are more likely than in the case of an arms-length 
bargain, and so corporate law places a high burden on the director to 
establish that he or she remained loyal.43 
Self-dealing is only one example of impaired incentives giving rise 
to loyalty claims. For instance, legal scholars have given significant 
attention to a fact pattern that William Bratton and Michael Wachter 
refer to as the “moderate downside.”44 When a corporation is neither 
 
41. See Foundations of Fiduciary Law, supra note 29, at 178 (discussing the 
proposition that anti-conflict rules are a prophylactic device to ensure full 
affirmative devotion); William T. Allen, et. al., Function Over Form: A 
Reasonable Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporate Law, 
56 Bus. Law. 1287, 1302 (2001) (“[W]here a majority [of the board] have 
personal interests in the transaction that are adverse to the interest of the 
shareholders, it cannot be presumed that the board will be motivated to 
achieve the highest transaction price the market will permit.”). One could also 
view self-dealing as a violation of the no-misappropriation obligation to the 
extent the fiduciary misappropriates value through a one-sided transaction. 
42. In an arms-length transaction without fraud or duress, one can assume that 
exchange transactions are mutually beneficial at some level (or they would 
not occur). See Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Limits of Integrative Bargaining, 
85 Geo. L.J. 369, 373–90 (1996) (discussing the mutually beneficial aspects 
of exchange transactions). One cannot make that same assumption when a 
conflicted fiduciary sits on both sides of the deal. Moreover, even in a 
mutually beneficial transaction, there are many distributional aspects that 
a self-dealing fiduciary may tilt to his or her advantage. Id. 
43. See Foundations of Fiduciary Law, supra note 29, at 184 (“The anti-
conflicts rules are sometimes taken to be protective of fiduciary loyalty, 
rather than an example of fiduciary loyalty itself.”). 
44. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 14, at 1874–75, 1885–87 (using the 
terminology “moderate downside”). See also Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, 
Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
967, 994–97 (2006) (describing incentive distortions that may occur when 
“the firm is neither a complete failure nor a stunning success”); Baird & 
Henderson, supra note 18, at 1329–33 (providing an example based on the 
case of Orban v. Field and making comparisons to zone of insolvency cases); 
Korsmo, supra note 14, at 1186–89 (discussing the Trados fact pattern). 
Simone Sepe uses game theoretical examples that depict what one might 
call the moderate downside, but with a fuller range of potential actions and 
outcomes than in Hypothetical A below. Sepe, supra note 14, at 351–55. 
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wildly successful nor hopelessly insolvent, conflicts can arise between 
common stock holders, as residual claimants, and a corporation’s fixed 
claimants.45 Fixed claimants include parties with discrete claims on the 
corporation’s assets or cash flow, such as lenders with the right to loan 
repayment, trade creditors with the right to payment for goods and 
services, employees with the right to salary and other cash compen-
sation, and traditional preferred stock holders entitled to receive a 
stated periodic dividend and payout at liquidation.46 In contrast, 
residual claimants such as common stock holders (1) receive financial 
benefit from the corporation only after payment of fixed claims and (2) 
enjoy unlimited participation in a company’s “upside” value in excess 
of fixed claims.47 
At the moderate downside, a fixed claimant may want the 
corporation to act conservatively in order to ensure satisfaction of fixed 
obligations while residual claimants may favor riskier strategies with 
greater upside potential.48 Bratton and Wachter illustrate these incent-
ives through a hypothetical similar to the following:49 
 
45.  See Sepe, supra note 14, at 312–15 (discussing potential conflicts).  
46. See id. at 314 n.12, 320 (listing payments owed to creditors, dividends 
owed to preferred shareholders, and wages owed to employees as examples 
of fixed claims). 
47. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 34, at 67 (“[S]hareholders are 
the residual claimants to the firm’s income. . . . The gains and losses from 
abnormally good or bad performance are the lot of the shareholders, whose 
claims stand last in line.”); Sepe, supra note 14, at 313 (describing the 
rights of common shareholders as residual claimants). 
48. See Fried & Ganor, supra note 44, at 972–95 (stating that holders with 
fixed claims “sometimes gain less from increases in firm value than they lose 
from decreases in firm value” resulting in fixed claimants choosing “lower-
risk, lower-value investment strategies over higher-risk, higher-value 
investment strategies”). More generally, incentive incompatibility between 
debt and equity is a common theme in corporate finance literature. E.g., 
Lucian Bebchuk, Ex Ante Costs of Violating Absolute Priority in 
Bankruptcy, 57 J. of Fin. 445, 447 (2002) (“Equityholders (and managers 
seeking to maximize the value of equity) might favor a risky project over a 
safer one even if the risky project offers a somewhat lower expected return, 
because the returns from favorable outcomes of the risky project would be 
captured by the equity holders, whereas the losses from its unfavorable 
outcomes would be partly borne by the debtholders.”); Robert E. Scott, 
The Truth About Secured Lending, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 1436, 1449 (1997) 
(“If the project succeeds, the equity interests capture all the gains, but if 
the project fails, the losses are shared with the debtholders. The debt 
cushion, in other words, can lead to excessively risky investments.”). 
49. E.g., Bratton & Wachter, supra note 14, at 1886 (including a similar example 
with a preferred stockholder as fixed claimant). I have used a creditor rather 
than a preferred stockholder in this example because I delay my explanation 
of preferred stock terms to the next subsection. Moreover, those who have 
illustrated the moderate-downside fact pattern through preferred-stock 
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Hypothetical A: Purely Fixed and Purely Residual Claimants at 
the Moderate Downside 
 
 Value Probability 
Acquisition offer for 
Company A 
 
$30,000,000  
Fixed claim (e.g., lender) 
 
$30,000,000  
Turnaround (if successful) 
 
$50,000,000 75% 
Turnaround (if unsuccessful)
 
$20,000,000 25% 
 
In this hypothetical, Company A receives an offer to sell its assets 
for $30 million—a price that satisfies an outstanding loan (the fixed 
claim) but leaves the common with nothing. Company A’s alternative 
is to attempt a turnaround that involves some risk but is more likely 
than not to produce value for the common. All other things being equal, 
the fixed claimant will want to accept the offer because it ensures 
repayment and the fixed claimant has nothing to gain by the turn-
around, but the common holders will want to attempt the turnaround 
for at least a chance at obtaining value. If either stakeholder has 
assumed a fiduciary obligation to the other, such as by serving on the 
corporation’s board of directors, courts may scrutinize the fiduciary’s 
conduct because this incentive structure may compromise the fiduc-
iary’s effort to maximize value for the beneficiary.50 
B. Venture Capital as Quasi-Residual Claimants 
Sometimes, when the cash flow rights of various stakeholders are 
not so distinctly fixed or residual, the incentives are ambiguous. 
Employees are fixed claimants with respect to salary but may also be 
 
hypotheticals have expressly analogized to the debtor-creditor context. See 
id. at 1886 (noting that the Trados fact pattern “replays the familiar problem 
of debt and equity on the downside”); Fried & Ganor, supra note 44, at 997 
(referring to preferred stock’s “debt-like cash flow rights” in the course of 
discussing the moderate-downside fact pattern). 
50. The most commonly discussed instance involves a common-controlled board 
of an insolvent corporation. In that situation, some courts have suggested 
that the board owes a fiduciary duty to the company’s creditors and may 
labor under a conflict-of-interest to the extent it is beholden to common 
holders. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 14, at 1886–87 (discussing 
Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland v. Pathe Commc’n, 324 See Civ. A. No. 
12150, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991)(“Credit Lyonnais”) and 
subsequent cases reducing the importance of Credit Lyonnais); Baird & 
Henderson, supra note 18, at 1324–28 (discussing Credit Lyonnais). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 1·2015 
Opportunity-Cost Conflicts in Corporate Law 
63 
compensated with stock or stock options.51 Lenders or vendors may be 
fixed claimants with respect to certain payment obligations but may 
also be paid with stock rights in order to conserve the corporation’s 
cash.52 Stakeholders possessing these hybrid economic rights could be 
called “quasi-residual claimants” because they have fixed claims on the 
corporation’s assets but also share somewhat in the corporation’s 
residual value.53 Trados grapples with a frequently occurring example 
of a quasi-residual claimant—venture capital investors in start-up 
companies. 
Trados Incorporated (Trados) was once a promising company that 
developed and sold popular translation software.54 The company 
attracted roughly $30 million in investment from venture capital funds, 
which received preferred stock (Trados preferred) and the right to name 
several members of the board of directors in exchange for their invest-
ment.55 A mix of company founders, key employees, and strategic 
investors owned the bulk of the company’s common stock and had the 
right to designate the remaining board members.56 This subpart exam-
ines the terms of the Trados preferred in detail to illustrate how pre-
ferred holders—traditionally categorized as fixed claimants—defy easy 
categorization. 
1. Fixed Claim: Liquidation Preference 
Typical of preferred stock in a variety of contexts, the Trados 
preferred had a fixed claim on the corporation’s assets in the form of a 
 
51. See Therese H. Maynard & Dana M. Warren, Business Planning: 
Financing the Start-Up Business and Venture Capital Financing 
319–22 (2010) (discussing equity compensation practices with respect to 
employees and non-employee service providers). 
52. See id. at 319–321. 
53. Sometimes the term quasi-residual claimant is used to describe how the 
incentives of fixed claimants change when the corporation is insolvent and 
fixed claimants therefore have a residual-like interest in increasing firm 
value to ensure repayment. See, e.g., Sepe, supra note 14, at 332–35 
(discussing how low asset value and other factors place a fixed claimant in 
a position similar to that of a residual claimant). Elsewhere, the term quasi-
residual claimant is used to describe a claimant with a mix of cash flow 
rights. See, e.g., Zenichi Shishido, Japanese Corporate Governance: The 
Hidden Problems of Corporate Law and Their Solutions, 25 Del J. Corp. 
L. 189, 211–14 (2000) (describing how employees become quasi-residual 
claimants when salary is supplemented by equity-based compensation such 
as stock options). This article uses the term in the latter sense. 
54. In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 21 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
55. Id. at 20, 33. 
56. See Defendants’ Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Class 
Certification at 1–4, In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17 (2013) 
(No. 1512-VCL) (identifying members of the plaintiff class). 
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liquidation preference.57 In the event of a merger or liquidation of the 
company, the liquidation preference entitled the preferred holders to 
certain payments before common stockholders could receive anything.58 
The preference was equal to the amount originally invested by the funds 
plus an additional amount representing an eight percent annual 
dividend that accrued but was not actually paid out.59 The liquidation 
preference totaled roughly $60 million by 2005, meaning that preferred 
holders would receive all proceeds of any sale60 at or below $60 million.61 
2. Quasi-Residual Claim: Conversion Rights 
In addition to a fixed claim on the liquidation preference, holders 
of the Trados preferred could also share in the company’s successes 
through conversion rights. Specifically, the preferred stock was con-
vertible into common shares at the election of the venture capital 
investors or if the company demonstrated a high level of success by 
completing an initial public offering (IPO).62 
Such conversion rights are ubiquitous in venture capital finan-
cings.63 Outside of the venture capital industry, preferred stockholders 
often have only debt-like financial rights that entitle preferred holders 
to a stated dividend and a liquidation preference with any residual value 
inuring to the benefit of the common holders.64 Because this more 
conventional model of preferred stock places a ceiling on the holder’s 
possible gains, it would be unsuitable to venture capital investing where 
most start-ups fail and investors must rely on a few big successes in 
 
57. See Maynard & Warren, supra note 51, at 471 (“[P]referred stock is 
generally distinguished by having the right to receive dividends or liquidation 
distributions before common stock. . . .”); Korsmo, supra note 14, at 1171–
72 (listing a liquidation preference as a core attribute of preferred stock). 
58. See In re Trados, 73 A.3d at 21–24 (describing the terms of the Trados 
preferred). 
59. Id. 
60. Theoretically, sale could mean either (1) piecemeal sale of individual 
assets or (2) sale of the company as a going concern through a merger or 
sale of substantially all assets. Following the facts of Trados, this article 
uses the term in the latter sense. 
61. See In re Trados, 73 A.3d at 20 (describing the result of the transaction 
for common and preferred shareholders).  
62. See id. at 21–22 (describing the conversion terms of the Trados preferred). 
63. See Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital 
Structure: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 Harv. 
L. Rev. 874, 879 (2003). 
64. See Melissa M. McEllin, Rethinking Jedwab: A Revised Approach to 
Preferred Shareholder Rights, 2010 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 895, 899–902 
(2010) (describing terms of traditional preferred stock). 
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order to achieve acceptable rates of return on a portfolio basis.65 
Accordingly, venture capital funds almost always receive the right to 
convert into common stock, give up their liquidation priority and 
dividend rights, and share in value beyond such fixed amounts.66 
On an as-converted basis, Trados preferred holders owned about 
half of the company’s shares.67 In other words, holders would convert 
into common and forfeit their liquidation preference if the company 
could sell, or complete an IPO, at a high enough price. For example, 
had Trados sold to Microsoft for $500 million net proceeds, the 
preferred holders would have converted and been entitled to 
approximately $250 million as common holders rather than being 
limited to their $60 million liquidation preference. 
3. Quasi-Residual Claim: Participation Rights 
Finally, some of the Trados preferred had “participation rights” up 
to a multiple of the amount invested. Participation rights allow 
preferred holders to share in moderate successes by receiving both their 
liquidation preference and a portion of any remaining proceeds from a 
merger or liquidation that might otherwise go to common share-
holders.68 It is customary for participation rights to be limited to a mult-
iple of the amount invested.69 The participation right becomes valuable 
when the company is acquired for a price that does not justify 
 
65. See Abraham J.B. Cable, Incubator Cities: Tomorrow’s Economy, 
Yesterday’s Start-Ups, 2 Mich. J. Priv. Equity & Venture Cap. L. 195, 
232 (2013). As a rule of thumb, the bulk of investment returns to venture 
capital funds are believed to come from 20% or fewer of their portfolio 
companies. See id. at 230 n.202. Empirical research supports the proposition 
that a very small number of successful investments drive returns to venture-
capital investors. See id. (reviewing empirical research); John Cochrane, The 
Risk and Return of Venture Capital, 75 J. Financial Econ. 3, 30 (2005) 
(analyzing venture capital investments and observing, even among 
companies that have achieved exit through an acquisition or IPO, a “small 
possibility of earning a truly astounding return, combined with the much 
larger probability of a more modest return”). There are, however, significant 
methodological challenges in empirically assessing the performance of 
investments in startups. See id. at 4-6 (describing selection-bias problems 
because investment outcomes are primarily observed in connection with 
positive exits such as IPOs and acquisitions).  
66. See Gilson & Schizer, supra note 63, and George G. Triantis, Financial 
Contract Design in the World of Venture Capital, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 305, 
317–20 (2001), for a more comprehensive explanation of why convertible 
stock is appropriate for venture capital investments.  
67. See In re Trados, 73 A.3d at 34 (showing ownership percentages of various 
stockholders). 
68. See Maynard & Warren, supra note 51, at 499–517 (describing 
participation rights). 
69. Id. at 507. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 1·2015 
Opportunity-Cost Conflicts in Corporate Law 
66 
conversion into common but that does create some value above the 
liquidation preference.70 For example, had Trados sold for $120 million 
and assuming all Trados preferred had participation rights, the venture 
capital funds would have received a total of $90 million ($60 million 
liquidation preference plus $30 million representing one-half of the 
remaining proceeds). In fact, the preferred stock was issued in various 
series, only some of which had these participation rights. 71 
C. The Conceptual Problems Posed by Quasi-Residual Claimants 
The Trados litigation arose when the Trados board approved sale 
of the company through a merger transaction in which preferred holders 
recovered the bulk of their liquidation preference but common holders 
received nothing.72 Disgruntled common holders responded with both 
an appraisal proceeding alleging that the transaction undervalued their 
shares and duty of loyalty claims against board members affiliated with 
the venture capital funds.73 
At first blush, the disproportionate payouts alone might seem to 
warrant exacting fairness scrutiny for the loyalty claims. For example, 
under the well-known case Sinclair Oil Corporation v. Levien,74 
Delaware courts apply fairness when a controlling shareholder receives 
a benefit “to the exclusion and at the expense of” other shareholders.75 
One might think the case applies to Trados because preferred share-
holders received merger consideration to the exclusion of common 
shareholders. A closer examination of Sinclair, however, suggests other-
wise and reveals the novelty of the questions posed by Trados. 
Sinclair involved claims by minority shareholders of Sinclair 
Venezuelan Oil Company (Subsidiary) against its majority shareholder, 
 
70.  See id. 
71. The participating shares constituted approximately one-third of the 
preferred shares. See In re Trados, 73 A.3d. at 21–23 (describing the 
terms of the Trados preferred). 
72. Id. at 20. 
73. Id. at 34–35. 
74.  280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971). 
75. Id. at 720. Though Sinclair involved claims against a controlling 
shareholder rather than board members, it is still instructive. Generally, 
fiduciary duties of controlling shareholders are more circumscribed than 
fiduciary duties of board members. See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, 
Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1255, 1273 
(2008) (explaining that “shareholder fiduciary duties are commonly 
understood to exist only for controlling shareholders” and in limited 
contexts). Therefore, board action that benefits a director’s affiliate to the 
exclusion and at the expense of other corporate stakeholders is presumably 
as (or more) problematic than similar action by a controlling shareholder. 
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Sinclair Oil Corporation (Parent).76 Plaintiffs accused the Parent of self-
dealing.77 More specifically, the Parent used its control to orchestrate a 
contract between the Subsidiary and another affiliate that required the 
latter to buy a specified level of output from the Subsidiary.78 The 
Parent then allowed its affiliate to breach the contract by making late 
payments and failing to buy the specified amounts.79 Because the 
contractual breaches resulted in improper benefit to the Parent at the 
Subsidiary’s expense, the court applied fairness review to the Parent’s 
actions.80 
Nothing in Sinclair warrants fairness review based solely on the 
receipt of a negotiated liquidation preference by a venture capital 
investor. Unlike the contract and subsequent breaches at issue in 
Sinclair, the terms of the Trados preferred were apparently negotiated 
at arm’s length with an independent board.81 Courts treat preferred 
stock rights as contractual rights, and corporate law sanctions contracts 
(and their subsequent performance) between insiders and a corporation 
where properly approved at the outset.82  
 
 
  
 
76. Sinclair, 280 A.2d at 719. 
77.  Id. at 720–21. 
78. Id. at 722–23. In addition to these self-dealing claims, the plaintiffs accused 
the Parent of “denial of expansion opportunities” through large (though 
statutorily permitted) dividends and channeling new business to other 
subsidiaries. Id. at 720–21. The court concluded that those claims should 
be evaluated under the deferential business judgment rule. Id. at 722. 
79. Id. at 723. 
80. Id. 
81. There are cases in which venture capital funds obtain board representation 
and then use their insider position to extract favorable terms in subsequent 
financing rounds. E.g., Carsanaro v. Bloodhound Tech., Inc., 65 A.3d 618, 
628 (Del. Ch. 2013). But those allegations were not made in Trados. 
82. See Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.61 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2013); Del. Gen. 
Corp. L. § 144 (citing corporate-law statutes that permit self-dealing when 
approved by independent directors or shareholders); Bratton & Wachter, 
supra note 14, at 1892 (“Value was taken in Trados, but only pursuant to 
the ex ante contract.”). Even those who view a board’s duties to preferred 
shareholders narrowly recognize the validity of preferred-stock preferences. 
See Strine, supra note 14, at 2027 (“The prevailing theory is simple: preferred 
stockholders are preferred to the extent that they secure preferences (i.e., 
additional rights that may have economic value) in their contract.”). But see 
Orban v. Field, 92 No. 12820, 1997 WL 153831 at n.26 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 1997) 
(suggesting that in some circumstances a board might have a fiduciary 
obligation to engage in efficient breach of a contract with preferred holders).  
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Accordingly, the Trados plaintiffs had to make a less straight-
forward claim. They focused their arguments on the timing of the trans-
action rather than the division of proceeds.83 They alleged that Trados 
was viable as a standalone entity, had been enjoying improving fortunes 
by some measures, and could be sold at a better price if given more 
time to operate as an independent company.84 
With nothing more, a poorly timed sale sounds like a duty of care 
rather than loyalty issue. To imbue the claims with a loyalty element, 
the plaintiffs argued that the preferred holders’ fixed claim (the 
liquidation preference) created the same incentive incompatibility as 
the creditor example in Hypothetical A above.85 
There is a problem, however, with this story: the venture capital 
investors were quasi-residual holders. All of the preferred holders had 
conversion rights, which entitled them to share in any large-scale 
successes.86 Some of the preferred holders also had participation rights, 
which entitled them to share in any proceeds above the liquidation 
preference.87 If there was additional value to be squeezed out of Trados, 
why would these investors pull the plug too early? 
To illustrate the court’s difficult task, it is useful to first recast the 
payouts from Hypothetical A in terms of a preferred stock financing. 
While this and other hypotheticals in this article are artificial in several 
respects,88 the exercise is nonetheless valuable in illustrating the 
additional conceptual challenges posed by quasi-residual claimants: 
 
 
 
 
 
83.  In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 1512-CC, 2009 WL 2225958, at *6–*7 
(Del. Ch. July 24, 2009). 
84. See id. (describing the plaintiffs’ fiduciary duty claim). 
85. See In re Trados, 73 A.3d at 49 (characterizing preferred stock cash flow 
rights as “debt-like”). 
86. See supra Part I.B.2 (describing conversion rights). 
87. See supra Part I.B.3 (describing participation rights). 
88. Most fundamentally, courts never have such concrete knowledge of expected 
outcomes. See Strine, supra note 14, at 2037 (discussing the difficulty of 
assessing competing expert testimony regarding the value of corporate entities 
and transactions). In addition, I have, like other commentators, assumed a 
risk-neutral investor. E.g., Brian Broughman, The Role of Independent 
Directors in Startup Firms, Utah L. Rev. 461, n. 35 (2010). Finally, I have 
assumed that any discount rate for the time delay of a turnaround or pivot 
in strategy is already reflected in the expected values presented.  
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Hypothetical B: VC Preferred and Common at the Moderate 
Downside 
 Value Probability 
Acquisition offer for 
Company B 
 
$30,000,000  
Liquidation preference 
(investment amount + 
accrued dividends) 
 
$30,000,000  
Turnaround (if successful) 
 
$50,000,000 75% 
Turnaround (if unsuccessful)
 
$20,000,000 25% 
 
If one focuses on the liquidation preference alone, this hypothetical 
produces precisely the same incentive incompatibility as Hypothetical 
A. The residual holder will want to roll the dice on a turnaround 
because there is no upside in accepting the offer. Putting aside 
participation rights for the moment, the fixed claimant (in this case, a 
preferred shareholder) will want to act conservatively because it has 
nothing to gain by taking the risk. If preferred shareholders control the 
board, there may be serious question whether we can trust that board 
to guard the interests of common holders.89 
Now consider the effect of participation rights on the parties’ 
incentives. Assume that all of the preferred shares in Hypothetical B 
have such rights and the preferred shareholders own half the company 
on an as-converted basis. In that event, the turnaround would have an 
expected value of $35 million to the preferred shareholders because they 
are entitled to both their liquidation preference and a portion of any 
additional value (up to a specified cap).90 The question becomes: does 
an extra $5 million in average expected value adequately motivate the 
preferred holder to attempt the turnaround? 
Next, consider how conversion rights affect incentives, even without 
participation rights. First, assume a wider range of possible outcomes 
than presented in Hypothetical A. In Trados, for example, management 
presented the board with a variety of strategies with varying levels of 
 
89. As discussed further below, the Chancery Court clearly identified the 
common holders as the primary beneficiaries of the board’s duties, though 
commentators have advocated for a different rule. See infra text 
accompanying notes 136–38. 
90. The amount is calculated as follows: (.25 * $20,000,000) + (.75 * 
($30,000,000 + (($50,000,000 - $30,000,000) / 2)). 
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risk and potential reward.91 The highest risk strategy was to signific-
antly revamp the company’s business plan—a “pivot” in start-up 
company jargon.92 If successful, this pivot strategy would have opened 
up a much larger market for the company and potentially resulted in 
considerably more value than immediate sale. To illustrate the potential 
effects of such a pivot, consider a new hypothetical with an expanded 
range of expected outcomes: 
Hypothetical C: Preferred and Common With Potential Pivot93 
 Expected Value Probability 
Acquisition offer for 
Company C 
 
$30,000,000  
Liquidation preference 
(investment amount + 
accrued dividends) 
 
$30,000,000  
Pivot (if successful) 
 
$300,000,000 20% 
Pivot (if no improvement) 
 
$30,000,000 40% 
Pivot (if unsuccessful) 
 
$0 40% 
 
Even without participation rights, the pivot has an average 
expected value of $42 million to the preferred holders because they have 
at least some opportunity to convert and participate in a large success.94 
Does an extra $12 million in expected value adequately motivate the 
preferred holders to attempt the pivot? 
Under these payout scenarios, the incentives of preferred and 
common holders appear to point in at least the same general direction. 
 
91. See In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 29 (Del. Ch. 2013) 
(describing three strategies for the company named “Merge-Up,” “Harvest,” 
and “Merge-Up Adjacent”). 
92. For a list of well-known pivots by successful start-ups such as Twitter, Groupon, 
Paypal, and Instagram, see Jason Nazar, 14 Famous Business Pivots,  
Forbes (Oct. 8, 2013 10:46 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonnazar/ 
2013/10/08/14-famous-business-pivots/ [http://perma.cc/8AUK-PYE6]. 
93. For relevant assumptions, see note 88. 
94. The amount is calculated as follows: (.4 * $30,000,000) + (.2 * ($300,000,000 
/ 2)). For a discussion of why the acquisition price does not reflect the value 
of the pivot, see infra note 110. 
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The question, therefore, is not whether common and preferred incent-
ives are compatible. Rather, the question is a more nuanced one: are 
the preferred holder’s incentives adequate? 
To be clear, there are payout scenarios where participation and 
conversion rights have limited effects and the incentives of preferred 
and common holders clash as in Hypothetical A and the examples 
typically used to illustrate the moderate downside.95 Specifically, when 
a turnaround has an expected value that is especially close to the 
preferred stock liquidation preference, participation and conversion 
rights might fail to capture much value and receipt of the liquidation 
preference is clearly preferable for the holder of preferred stock.96 But 
this limited range of clear incentive incompatibility arises in precisely 
the situation where common holders have the least to gain by 
continuing and suffer the least severe consequences from a sale. As soon 
as we introduce some meaningful chance at higher values above the 
liquidation preference, participation and conversion rights begin to 
align incentives.97 
The law has never required perfect incentive alignment. For 
example, most corporate directors for U.S. publicly traded companies 
are quasi-residual claimants. Annual cash compensation in the form of 
director fees constitutes a fixed claim on corporate assets.98 In an 
attempt to better align the interests of board members and share-
holders, directors also receive equity compensation such as restricted 
stock or stock options.99 While these residual-like claims may bring the 
board members into better alignment with common shareholders than 
purely fixed compensation, this is a different sort of equity interest than 
that of a long-term shareholder. Board members typically receive 
 
95. See supra note 44 (referring to examples of moderate downside). 
96. For example, if Hypothetical C is altered so that a pivot has an eighty percent 
chance of producing $35 million and a twenty percent chance of a total loss, 
then the preferred holders might prefer the $30 million sale because 
participation rights do not give the preferred sufficient interest in the pivot’s 
success. But doing so forecloses an opportunity for the common holders to 
realize $2 million in value (their share of the average expected value of a pivot). 
97. For instance, if we alter the example in note 96 so there is just a five 
percent chance of a $300 million exit, the expected value of the turnaround 
to preferred holders exceeds the sale price and the question becomes one 
of incentive adequacy rather than incompatibility. Similarly, if one 
assumes an eighty percent chance of a $50 million (rather than $35 
million) outcome and a twenty percent chance of a total loss, the expected 
value of a turnaround to the preferred holders exceeds the sale price and 
the question is one of incentive adequacy rather than incompatibility. 
98. See Katherine M. Brown, New Demands, Better Boards: Rethinking 
Director Compensation in an Era of Heightened Corporate Governance, 82 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1102, 1121–22 (discussing annual cash fees to directors). 
99. See id. at 1122–29 (describing equity compensation practices). 
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annual or semiannual grants of equity awards, meaning that board 
members potentially profit from stock price volatility that fails to pro-
duce value for long-term shareholders.100 If this imperfect alignment of 
incentives resulted in close judicial scrutiny, there would be little room 
for the business judgment rule. 
In fact, even where all shareholders hold the same type of residual 
cash flow rights, differing ownership percentages can skew incentives. 
Consider a company with an all-common structure and a board 
comprised of: a representative of a corporate conglomerate that owns 
25 percent of the company’s stock, a representative of a private equity 
fund that owns 15 percent of the company’s stock, an activist hedge 
fund that owns 5 percent of the company’s stock, and an individual 
who is unaffiliated with any of the foregoing and owns 0.01 percent of 
the company’s stock.  Based on differing ownership percentages alone, 
a gain or loss by the company has substantially different economic 
implications for each shareholder just described. Presumably, the 
intensity of each director's incentives vary accordingly.101 Yet a showing 
of proportional financial benefit (distribution of cash flow in proportion 
to common share ownership) has ordinarily been sufficient to defeat 
allegations of conflict.102 If the law required perfect incentive alignment, 
proportional financial benefit would not be sufficient. 
In short, there was no bright-line rule in Delaware law requiring 
fairness review of the Trados board’s actions.103 Instead, the court was 
required to perform a more nuanced and fact-intensive analysis of 
incentives. 
 
100. See id. at 1130 (footnotes omitted) (“Critics of using stock options . . . 
argue that options do not in fact properly align the interests of directors 
and shareholders. Unlike holders of ‘straight’ equity, option holders ‘share 
in the creation of shareholder value but not in its erosion’ because options 
asymmetrically reward only stock price appreciation. This asymmetry can 
make directors too risk-inclined.”). 
101. For an example of these incentive effects outside of corporate law, see STEVEN 
D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE ECONOMIST 
EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING 72 (2005) (finding that real 
estate agents receiving percentage commissions sell houses faster and for lower 
prices than when they sell their own houses). See also Robert H. Sitkoff, The 
Economic Structure of Fiduciary Law, 91 B. U. L. REV. 1039, 1041 (2011) 
(using the real-estate commission example to illustrate the intractability of 
incentive misalignment between beneficiaries and fiduciaries).  
102. See Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 65–66 
(Del. 1989); In re Morton’s Rest. Grp. Inc. S’holders Litig., 74 A.3d 656, 
662 (Del. Ch. 2013); In re Synthes, Inc. S’holder Litig., 50 A.3d 1022, 
1040 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
103. But see infra Part IV.A (acknowledging, but disfavoring, an alternative 
reading of Trados that hinges fairness review on the imperfect incentive 
alignment between common and preferred). 
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D. The Trados Solution: Opportunity-Cost Analysis 
The trial court directly confronted the analytical challenge of quasi-
residual rights by discussing incentives of directors affiliated with funds 
possessing participation rights. This analysis marks an important step 
forward in analyzing the moderate-downside fact pattern in venture 
capital financings. Pretrial Trados gave only lip service to the defend-
ants’ arguments that their incentives were aligned with common 
holders.104 Legal scholarship to date, though deserving credit for many 
key insights on which this article builds,105 has sometimes analyzed the 
moderate-downside with stylized fact patterns that assume away 
participation or conversion rights.106 
The trial court grounded its analysis of the defendants’ incentives 
in a well-chronicled pattern of behavior in venture capital investing. 
The court explained: 
Venture capitalists will sometimes liquidate an otherwise viable 
firm, if its expected returns are not what they (or their investors) 
expected, or not worth pursuing further, given limited resources 
and the need to manage other portfolio firms. This may seem 
irrational, but it makes perfect economic sense when viewed from 
the venture capitalist’s need to allocate [his] time and resources 
among various ventures. Although the individual company may 
be economically viable, the return on time and capital to the 
individual venture capitalist is less than the opportunity cost.107 
 
104. See In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 1512-CC, 2009 WL 2225958, at 
*7 (Del Ch. July 24, 2009) (briefly acknowledging defendants’ arguments 
that incentives of common and preferred holders were aligned). 
105. For example, Bratton and Wachter provide a particularly strong analysis 
of the difficulty parties will have contracting around Trados—an insight 
that is aligned with this article’s ultimate recommendation for a narrow 
interpretation of the case. See infra Part IV.C. In addition, a number of 
legal scholars have usefully introduced the shut-down dynamic to legal 
scholarship. See infra note 107. 
106. Principally, Bratton and Wachter demonstrate incentive-incompatibility 
through an example similar to Hypothetical B. In that example, they 
disregard participation rights, and they choose value ranges for which 
conversion rights are not relevant. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 14, at 
1886. In contrast, other commentators use examples that implicate 
conversion rights (but do not include participation rights). See, e.g., Brian 
J.Broughman, supra note 88, at 471–74; Fried & Ganor, supra note 44, at 
995–97; Sepe, supra note 14, at 351–55. 
107. In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 51 (Del. Ch. 2013) (quoting 
William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital 
Organizations, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 473, 507 (1993); Michael A. Utset, 
Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic Behavior & Venture Survival: A Theory of 
Venture-Capital Financed Firms, 2002 WISC. L. REV. 45, 110, n. 218; Michael 
A. Utset, High-Powered (Mis)incentives and Venture Capital Contracts, 
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An example helps illustrates the “shut-down” dynamic as depicted 
in legal scholarship and invoked by the court. Assume that the preferred 
holder in Hypothetical C is a $200 million venture capital fund (Fund 
C) that invested $20 million in ten separate start-up companies. 
Company C’s preferred controlled board must now decide whether to 
accept the $30 million offer (equal to the liquidation preference) or 
attempt the pivot with an average expected value of $42 million. How 
would the fund decide? 
One way to answer the question is to focus on the effort the fund 
will exert in attempting a pivot. Company C will look to the fund for 
assistance with hiring new executives with relevant experience, 
performing market research, making budgeting decisions, evaluating 
progress by analyzing sales results, considering and negotiating 
financing alternatives for new initiatives, and assessing exit strategies 
if the initiatives are successful.108 The fund managers have only so much 
time; continuing with Company C limits the time available for other 
portfolio companies.109 In other words, Company C’s pivot has opport-
unity costs that will likely drive the fund’s decision. 
 
7 OHIO ST. ENTREP. BUS. L. J. 45, 56 (2012)). In its discussion of the shut-
down dynamic, the court also cited additional sources, such as Robert P. 
Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy of the 
Corporation, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 37, 56 n.78 (2006); Broughman & Fried, infra 
note 153; Fried & Ganor, supra note 44; D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure 
of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 315, 356 (2005). 
108. Venture capital investors are recognized as particularly active investors, 
providing companies with significant managerial assistance. See 
Maynard & Warren, supra note 51, at 435 (“Venture capital investors 
make their knowledge, contacts, and expertise available to their portfolio 
companies and consult with and assist management on almost every key 
decision the company faces.”); Korsmo, supra note 14, at 1169–70 
(discussing venture capital investors’ active role in management of 
portfolio companies and their expertise in finance and management); D. 
Gordon Smith, Venture Capital Contracting in the Information Age, 2 J. 
Small & Emerging Bus. 133, 138–40 (1998) (discussing a wide range of 
managerial assistance provided by venture capital managers, including 
advice related to marketing, strategy, financing, and recruiting). 
109. One might ask why funds do not hire additional personnel to maintain an 
active role in all viable companies. In short, hiring and supervising additional 
agents is expensive. For example, researchers have considered an analogous 
question—the optimal size for a venture capital fund. See generally Douglas 
J. Cumming, The Determinants of Venture Capital Portfolio Size: Empirical 
Evidence, 79 J. BUS. 1083 (2006) (modeling venture capital portfolio 
construction); Josh Lerner, et al., Private Equity, Venture Capital, 
and the Financing of Entrepreneurship: The Power of Active 
Investing 349-71 (2012) (describing the effects of increasing fund sizes); 
Diane Mulchaney, et al., “We Have Met the Enemy . . . and He Is Us”: 
Lessons From Twenty Years of the Kauffman Foundation’s Investments in 
Venture Capital and the Triumph of Hope Over Reason (2012) (noting 
superior performance of smaller funds in the Kauffman Foundation’s own 
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For example, assume (1) the fund has seen four of its portfolio 
companies file for bankruptcy without any return to equity; (2) two of 
the remaining portfolio companies have prospects similar to Company 
C, and (3) the remaining three portfolio companies have slightly better 
prospects such as a thirty percent chance for a $300 million outcome, a 
forty percent chance for $30 million outcome, and a thirty percent 
chance for a total loss. If the fund only has the time and resources to 
continue with three companies, the fund will want to sell Company C 
even if attempting the pivot has a higher expected value.110 Put another 
way, opportunity costs impair the fund’s incentives to wring out 
additional value available from Company C. 
Some of the evidence in Trados fits this account particularly well. 
The court summarized one director’s testimony as follows: 
[T]he evidence at trial established that Gandhi faced a conflict 
and acted consistent with Sequoia’s interest in exiting from 
Trados and moving on. As Gandhi explained at trial, when  
portfolio); Sven Weber & Jason Liou, Dialing Down: Venture Capital  
Returns to Smaller Fund Sizes, Silicon Valley Bank (May 31, 2010),  
https://www.svb.com/Blogs/Aaron_Gershenberg/Dialing_Down__Venture
_Capital_Returns_to_Smaller_Size_Funds/ [http://perma.cc/4833-QQJC] 
(discussing the advantages of smaller sized venture capital funds). According 
to this literature, adding companies to a portfolio initially has benefits, such 
as diversification and complementary investments. See Cumming, supra, at 
1087 (modeling fund portfolio construction and explaining why the projected 
marginal benefits curve will initially slope upwards). At some point, however, 
marginal costs increase due to agency costs associated with any additional 
personnel, inattention if additional personnel are not hired, potential conflicts 
and competition among portfolio companies, and other factors. See Cumming, 
supra, at 1087–90 (discussing increasing marginal costs of expansion); Lerner, 
supra, at 360-62 (discussing the costs of expansion, including managing 
additional personnel). Consistent with this model, empirical research indicates 
that fund performance eventually declines with size. Lerner et al., supra, 
at 357-370 (observing declining performance at $280 million fund size); Weber 
& Liou, supra, at 6–7 (identifying $250 million as an optimal fund size); 
Mulchaney et al., supra, at 23–26 (criticizing the performance of funds over 
$500 million). 
110. In such a circumstance, one might wonder why an entrepreneur cannot 
convince a third party of a pivot’s value and engineer a more advantageous 
sale transaction or other take-out of Fund C. The primary obstacle to such 
a transaction is information asymmetry—entrepreneurs will have a difficult 
time convincing third parties of the value of pivot. See Gilson & Schizer, 
supra note 63, at 878–79 (discussing problems of information asymmetry in 
early stage companies); Brian J. Broughman & Jesse M. Fried, Do VCs Use 
Inside Rounds to Dilute Founders? Some Evidence from Silicon Valley, 18 
J. Corp. Fin. 1104 (2012) (discussing how “informational lock-in” makes it 
difficult for startups to obtain financing from sources other than existing 
venture-capital investors). In addition, the most likely sources of 
financing—other venture capital funds—are likely to be just as lukewarm 
as Fund C regarding a moderate success. 
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Sequoia invests, it hopes for “really fast” growth and “very large 
outsized returns.” Within six months after the Uniscape merger,111 
Gandhi had concluded that Trados would not deliver outsized 
returns and that Sequoia’s “real opportunity” was only “to 
recover a fraction” of its $13 million investment in Uniscape. By 
the end of 2002, Gandhi had decided not to put significant time 
into Trados beyond Board meetings and only to attend by phone 
unless meetings were held locally. From his perspective, this was 
simply a matter of prioritizing his time based on how Trados 
would perform for Sequoia relative to other opportunities with “a 
lot of upside.” He later elaborated: “[M]y most, you know, limited 
resource is just where I’m putting my time. And it’s just better 
to work on something brand-new that has a chance. . . . Is [the 
next Sequoia investment] going to be Google?”112 
As characterized by the court, this testimony is a rather frank 
admission that Trados was a low priority for this director and that he 
was trying to reallocate his time to more promising companies in his 
fund’s portfolio. 
Extrapolating from the specific facts of the case, the court is 
identifying a novel, or rarely discussed, fact pattern of opportunity-cost 
conflicts. The concept is separate from the conflicts that may arise 
between preferred and common cash-flow rights. One can imagine 
opportunity-cost conflicts arising even between common shareholders. 
Any active investor may be faced with choices among alternative 
investments and may allow such concerns to influence decisions made 
as a fiduciary. Possible examples include a shareholder in a close 
corporation like that depicted in the introduction to this article, active 
hedge fund investors,113 and parent corporations with multiple sub-
sidiaries.114 In each case, separate and apart from any conflicts created 
by divergent cash flow rights, these active investors may have salient 
alternatives (opportunity costs) that improperly influence their abilities 
to serve in fiduciary capacities. 
While novel, the opportunity-cost conflict fits within existing 
conceptions of corporate fiduciary law. Returning to the component 
loyalty obligations discussed above, opportunity-cost conflicts most 
 
111. Sequouia invested in Trados indirectly—it initially invested in Uniscape, 
which then merged with Trados. See Trados, 73 A. 3d at 23. 
112. In re Trados, 73 A.3d at 52. 
113. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 75, at 1278 (discussing increased activism 
by hedge funds). 
114. For example, the plaintiffs in Sinclair could have framed their “denial of 
expansion opportunities” claims as opportunity-cost conflicts. See supra note 
78. Notably, the court was hesitant to evaluate those claims under fairness 
review, arguably consistent with recommendations in Part III of this article. 
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directly implicate the loyalty obligation of full effort.115 The corporate 
director who allows alternative investment possibilities to influence his 
or her exercise of board power has arguably not pursued the bene-
ficiary’s interests with the level of effort expected of a fiduciary. As with 
self-dealing, operating under an opportunity cost conflict (that is, 
exercising board power with incentives to redeploy capital and service) 
is not itself a breach of fiduciary duty.116 In Trados, the court deter-
mined that the board in fact acted fairly towards the common share-
holders because their prospects of obtaining value for their shares was 
negligible.117 But the court had strong evidence that some directors were 
allowing extraneous factors to influence their choices on behalf of the 
common holders, and so it was understandable that the court departed 
from its typical deference to board judgment and examined the fid-
uciaries’ conduct closely.118 
II. Conceptual Strengths 
Pretrial Trados received significant attention from legal scholars 
not only because it affected an economically important method of 
finance, but also because it implicates key conceptual considerations. 
The opinion has been a springboard for examining fundamental quest-
ions such as who fiduciary duties should protect,119 the important role 
that constituency directors play in today’s financing market,120 and the 
correct “theory” of preferred stock.121 
The trial court’s opinion is an important elaboration of Pretrial 
Trados but has received little attention in legal scholarship to date. 
This Part therefore considers the conceptual strengths of the court’s 
new reasoning. These strengths include: providing a theoretically sound 
framework for analyzing fiduciary behavior, undermining a prominent 
alternative to the court’s chosen rule of common maximization, and 
providing at least a plausible rationale for common maximization. 
 
115. See supra text accompanying notes 31–41 (discussing full effort as a 
loyalty obligation). 
116. See supra text accompanying note 43. 
117. See In re Trados, 73 A.3d at 77–78 (determining that the merger was fair 
to the common shareholders). 
118. To be clear, under Trados a fiduciary is not irrevocably required to 
continue pursuing the beneficiary’s interests—he or she can resign and 
cease to be a fiduciary. What the fiduciary cannot do under Trados is let 
extraneous factors like opportunity costs influence exit decisions that are 
supposed to be made on the common holders’ behalf. 
119. See Korsmo, supra note 14, at 1185–89 (discussing Trados). 
120. See Sepe, supra note 14, at 345–50 (discussing Trados). 
121. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 14, at 1874–1900 (discussing Trados). 
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A. Sound Underpinnings 
The Trados court’s portrayal of investor behavior—and the 
influence of investment alternatives—is well grounded in economic 
theory. In other words, consideration of opportunity costs may be 
necessary to the extent courts are committed to analyzing incentive 
structures of venture capital and other investors. 
In economics, it is axiomatic that individuals make decisions on the 
basis of opportunity costs.122 Opportunity costs are distinct from the 
undesirable consequences of a decision and from the types of expend-
itures and accruals categorized as costs by accountants.123 Instead, the 
opportunity cost of a proposed course of action is the highest value 
alternative forsaken.124 The concept takes on vital importance in 
economics because in a world of scarce resources economic actors cannot 
pursue every course of action with positive expected value in the sense 
of producing desirable outcomes or attributes in excess of undesirable 
outcomes or attributes. Instead, economic actors must make decisions 
by comparing the value of alternatives.125 Thus, when one considers 
whether to build a swimming pool, the costs that drive the decision are 
not cash outlays for concrete or the pain of digging or supervising the 
work. Though unpleasant in some sense, these factors are not choice 
influencing in the absence of a comparator such as buying a new car, 
spending time with family, or saving for retirement.126 
Some observers have nibbled away at the edges of this insight by 
questioning how effectively people make such comparisons.127 One 
 
122. See N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics 5–6 (6th ed. 2011) 
(identifying the concept of opportunity costs—“The Cost of Something Is What 
You Give up to Get It”—as one of his “10 Principles of Economics”); Karen I. 
Vaughn, Does it Matter That Costs Are Subjective?, 46 Southern Econ. J. 
702 (describing opportunity costs as a “benchmark of ‘economic thinking’”). 
123. See Armen Alchian, Economic Forces at Work 301 (1969) 
(contrasting opportunity costs with the “undesirable attributes of some 
event”); Vaughn, supra note 122, at 705 (contrasting opportunity costs 
with “outlays” or expenditures). 
124. See Alchian, supra note 123, at 301 (“In economics, the cost of an event 
is the highest-valued opportunity necessarily forsaken.”). 
125. See id. at 302 (explaining that one “cannot choose all events whose desirable 
features more than offset their undesirable ones”). 
126. Id. at 303–04. 
127. E.g., Dan Ariely, Predictably Rational: The Hidden Forces That 
Shape Our Decisions 55–74 (2010) (describing experimental research in 
which participants’ choice of products was irrationally affected by setting 
the price of one item at zero). 
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entertaining survey suggests that even economists struggle with the 
concept.128 
But in venture capital and similar contexts, where active investors 
must allocate effort among competing projects,129 it seems likely that 
whether a particular course of action is worth it does depend on the 
investors’ alternatives. The same might not be true of all portfolio 
investors—more passive investors may be able to inexpensively add new 
securities to a broadly diversified portfolio without foreclosing alternat-
ives.130 But without adding additional personnel, which may be costly,131 
a venture capital fund only has so much human capital to invest.132 
What this means for fiduciary duty analysis is that a court may 
have difficulty analyzing incentives without expanding the inquiry 
beyond transaction terms and payouts between the parties. The factors 
that influence the decision to sell or continue with an investment may 
be exogenous to the direct business relationship between the fiduciary 
and the beneficiary. In the Trados example, these exogenous factors at 
least include the fund’s expectations for its other portfolio companies. 
But even the portfolio may be too narrow a view. For instance, if Fund 
C in the example above has a relatively weak portfolio, then Company 
 
128. See P. J. Ferraro & L. O. Taylor, Do Economists Recognize an Opportunity 
Cost When They See One? A Dismal Performance from the Dismal Science, 
4 Contributions to Econ. Analysis & Pol’y 7 (2005) (describing survey 
results in which a majority of economists failed to correctly answer a basic 
question regarding opportunity costs); but see Joel Potter & Shane Sanders, 
Do Economists Recognize an Opportunity Cost When They See One? A 
Dismal Performance or an Arbitrary Concept?, 79(2) S. Econ. J. 248, 248–
56 (2012) (suggesting that Ferraro and Taylor’s question was not so basic). 
129. See supra note 108 (describing the managerial assistance provided by venture 
capital funds to their portfolio). This section focuses on the fund manager’s 
allocation of time, rather than its allocation of financial capital, because the 
latter is not available for re-investment in other startups under the terms of 
the fund’s agreement with its limited partners. See Kate Litvak, Venture 
Capital Limited Partnership Agreements: Understanding Compensation 
Arrangements, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 161, 175 (2009) (explaining that “proceeds 
are distributed (usually) promptly after profits are realized”). Thus, the 
shutdown dynamic involves a redeployment of time and not financial capital.  
130. For example, the capital asset pricing model assumes that investors are 
compensated for only systematic risk because they can easily diversify 
away company-specific risk by holding a broad market portfolio. See 
Burton G. Malkiel, A Random Walk Down Wall Street: The 
Time-Tested Strategy for Successful Investing 757–76 (2012). 
131. See supra note 109 (discussing the costs of expanding a fund). 
132. At least one financial economist invokes the concept of opportunity costs in 
modeling a fund manager’s investment decisions. See Cumming, supra note 
109, at 5 n.4. (“For example, if there are 5 firms in the original portfolio, the 
opportunity cost of adding a 6th firm are the assistance and resources allocated 
to the 6th firm that would have been allocated to the original 5 firms.”).  
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C may be among its better performers.133 In that case, it is tempting to 
assume Fund C is motivated to shut down its other companies to focus 
attention on Company C. But Fund C will want to do so only if 
continuing with Company C exceeds the opportunity cost of starting a 
new fund (if Fund C’s poor performance hasn’t foreclosed that poss-
ibility), changing careers, or spending time with family or a new hobby. 
The reference to nonpecuniary uses of time (spending time with 
family or friends) is worth expanding on because it underscores the 
limits of opportunity cost analysis. In their purest and most provocative 
form, opportunity costs are fundamentally subjective and accordingly 
difficult to observe. Nobel Laureate James M. Buchanan, who devoted 
an entire book to the concept of opportunity costs, concluded “[c]ost 
cannot be measured by someone other than the decision-maker because 
there is no way that subjective experience can be directly observed.”134 
Like economists, therefore, courts may never have full visibility regard-
ing a fiduciary’s incentives and choices.135 But courts, like economists, 
may find suitable enough indicia of opportunity costs and make 
defensible enough predictions about an economic actor’s choices.136 
In short, by invoking the shut-down dynamic the court properly 
identified the type of external considerations that induce economic 
choice and define a fiduciary’s incentives. Precisely how this clever 
doctrinal solution should be implemented for future cases is the subject 
of Part III below. For now, it is sufficient to acknowledge that the court 
sensibly framed the issue at a conceptual level. 
B. Normative Implications of Opportunity-Cost Conflicts 
So far, this article has assumed that the Trados court was correct 
in selecting a rule of common maximization. In other words, it has 
assumed that when an affiliate of a preferred holder serves on a board 
 
133. See text accompanying notes 107–108 (discussing a hypothetical venture 
capital fund incentivized to shut down a viable company). 
134. James M. Buchanan, Cost and Choice: An Inquiry in Economic 
Theory 43 (1969). 
135. For Buchanan, this subjectivity was deeply unsettling to prevailing 
applications of economic theory. Even market prices for factors of 
production do not always capture full opportunity costs except in particular 
states of equilibrium that Buchanan found unlikely in practice. See Vaughn, 
supra note 122, at 707 (discussing Buchanan’s requirements). Hence, 
Buchanan warned that efforts by economists to guide policy decisions 
through cost-benefit analysis were fraught with methodological failures. For 
example, Buchanan noted the difficulty of calibrating punishment to crime 
if choice-influencing opportunity costs are not measurable. See Buchanan, 
supra note 134, at 93–94 (discussing the work of Gary Becker). 
136. Cf., William Baumol, Review of Cost and Choice, 8 J. Econ. Literature 
1210 (1970) (stating that Buchanan is correct in principle but overstates 
the problem because market prices closely approximate subjective costs). 
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of directors, his or her primary duty is to protect the common share-
holders. In fact, this issue is hotly debated. Commentators disagree on 
whether the beneficiary of corporate fiduciary duties should be common 
holders, preferred holders, the corporation as an entity, or some 
combination of those alternatives. 
In particular, an alternative rule of “enterprise maximization” has 
received significant support in recent scholarship.137 Under a rule of 
enterprise maximization, directors would owe fiduciary duties to the 
corporation, as distinct from any particular group or class of invest-
ors.138 In the Trados fact pattern, a rule of enterprise maximization 
would mean the board should be trained on the goal of increaseing 
enterprise value, regardless of how that value was to be distributed 
among investors, and should sell if the expected value of doing so 
exceeded the expected value of remaining a standalone entity. 
This Part explores how an opportunity-cost focus implicitly supp-
orts the court’s rule of common maximization by (1) exposing the rule 
of enterprise value as too atomistic and (2) suggesting a plausible 
explanation for why a rule of common maximization is necessary to 
induce entrepreneurs to enter into venture capital bargains. 
1. Why Stop at the Enterprise? 
At first blush, the rule of enterprise maximization is normatively 
compelling. Proponents of enterprise maximization envision the rule as 
a default that the parties could override by specific contractual arrange-
ment.139 In traditional law-and-economics scholarship, such default cor-
porate law rules are ordinarily conceived as majoritarian or bargain 
mimicking rules, meaning they are an attempt to approximate what 
most parties want most of the time.140 The value in setting such defaults  
137. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 14, at 1885–86 (discussing enterprise 
maximization); Baird & Henderson, supra note 18, at 1323–28 (noting 
case law discussing the concept of enterprise maximization).  
138.  See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 14, at 1884–86 (discussing enterprise 
maximization). 
139. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 14, at 1895–99; Baird & Henderson, 
supra note 18, at 1328–33 (suggesting that venture capitalists should be 
able to negotiate their fiduciary duties through contract). Baird and 
Henderson are somewhat ambivalent towards enterprise maximization 
because they question more broadly whether fiduciary-duty analysis, as 
opposed to contract principles, should govern. Id. at 3332-38. This author 
shares the view that parties should have ability to contract around Trados’s 
rule. See infra Part IV.C (discussing some of the difficulties parties will 
encounter trying to contract around the case).  
140. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 47, at 92 (“Socially optimal 
fiduciary rules approximate the bargain that investors and managers 
would have reached if they could have bargained (and enforced their 
agreements) at no cost.”); Baird & Henderson, supra note 18 at 1327 
(describing fiduciary duties as gap-fillers); Thomas A. Smith, The 
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is to reduce transaction costs of the parties entering into a business 
relationship through a corporate vehicle.141 
At the risk of stating the obvious, it is important that a 
majoritarian default rule in fact approximates what most parties want. 
In a hypothetical world, featuring a large array of organizational 
choices, the standard might not be so high. A particular package of 
default rules would serve a useful purpose as long as some constituency 
finds it acceptable. Others could simply pick a different entity. 
But in practice, there is a fairly limited range of entities from which 
entrepreneurs choose.142 These entities differ across a wide range of 
variables including management rights, mechanics of equity compens-
ation, and tax treatment.143 With a small number of entities varying 
across a wide range of attributes, it seems likely that choosing an entity 
is largely a matter of tradeoff, and parties are likely to accept a great 
many suboptimal features of secondary importance as they emphasize 
 
Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of 
Fiduciary Duty, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 214, 216–17 (1999) (discussing the 
approach of “leading economic analysis of corporate law” and citing Frank 
Easterbrook, Daniel Fischel, and Jonathan Macey). 
141. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 34, at 92 (“The fiduciary 
principle is an alternative to elaborate promises and extra monitoring.”); 
Baird & Henderson, supra note 18, at 1315 n.28 (“The principal virtue of 
using fiduciary duties is contracting efficiency.”). 
142. The primary choices are corporations and limited liability companies (LLCs). 
Yoichiru Taku, What type of entity should I form?, Startup Co.  
Lawyer (Mar. 12, 2009), http://www.startupcompanylawyer.com/2009/ 
03/12/what-type-of-entity-should-i-form/ [http://perma.cc/N4PG-JEZH] 
[hereinafter What type of entity?] (discussing the choice between corporations 
and LLCs). The vast majority of high-growth start-ups seeking venture capital 
financing are structured as corporations. See generally Joseph Bankman, The 
Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 1737 (1994) 
(considering why entrepreneurs and venture capitalists use C-corporations 
despite arguable tax advantages of LLCs); Victor Fleischer, The Rational 
Exuberance of Structuring Venture Capital Start-ups, 57 Tax L. Rev. 137 
(2003) (considering reasons for use of C-corporations); Gilson & Schizer, supra 
note 63, at 879 (asserting that tax treatment largely explains use of convertible 
preferred stock in venture capital financings); Daniel S. Goldberg, Choice of 
Entity for a Venture Capital Start-up: The Myth of Incorporation, 55 Tax 
Law. 923 (2002) (discussing tax considerations in choice of entity decisions); 
Susan C. Morse, Startup Ltd.: Tax Planning and Initial Incorporation 
Decision, 14 Fla. Tax Rev. 319 (2013) (reviewing legal scholarship on choice 
of entity for venture-backed start-ups). An LLC is considered more suitable 
for a livelihood business that is intended to primarily generate income for those 
working in the business. See What type of entity?, supra 142 (using the 
example of a consulting firm). 
143. See Fleischer, supra note 142, at 173 (discussing the role of management 
rights and equity compensation practices in choice of entity). 
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a few key features in their decision-making. In many cases, consider-
ations outside of corporate law may drive the decision,144 and the parties 
may have limited appetite to fine-tune a large number of corporate 
governance features. The upshot is that an unpopular corporate default 
rule can itself become a transaction cost as parties make do with it. 
With that background, is it reasonable to assume that, ex ante, 
parties to a corporate financing will ordinarily want a rule of enterprise 
maximization? To understand the case for the rule, start with the 
assumption that, all other things being equal, the parties to a trans-
action want to maximize the size of their combined welfare so there is 
more to divide between them.145 For the moment, also assume that the 
parties’ combined welfare is measured by firm or enterprise value.146 
Common maximization may not achieve the goal, framed in this way. 
The following payout scenario, which is similar to Hypothetical B 
but with worse prospects for a turnaround, helps illustrate the concept: 
Hypothetical D: Value-Destroying Turnaround 
 Value Probability 
Acquisition offer for 
Company D 
 
$30,000,000  
Liquidation preference 
(investment amount + 
accrued dividends) 
 
$30,000,000  
Turnaround (if successful) 
 
$50,000,000 25% 
Turnaround (if unsuccessful)
 
$20,000,000 75% 
Average expected value of 
turnaround 
$27,500,000  
 
Looking at these payouts alone, the common holders would hazard 
the turnaround because they have nothing to lose by doing so—the 
preferred have claims on the entire acquisition price through their 
liquidation preference. But the average expected value of an attempted  
144. See id. at 155–59, 167–73, 182–83 (discussing the tax preferences and 
constraints of venture capital limited partners, tax consequences of equity 
compensation practices, and the availability of tax-free mergers at exit). 
145. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of 
Contract Law, 113 Yale L.J. 541, 550–54 (2003) (providing a game-
theoretical explanation of why “sophisticated parties at the negotiation 
stage prefer to write contracts that maximize total benefits” rather than 
preferring “a larger share of a smaller pie”). 
146. See Baird & Henderson, supra note 18, at 1313 (“[E]x ante investors 
presumptively are interested in maximizing the value of the firm.”). 
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turnaround is only $27.5 million for the enterprise as a whole, lower 
than the $30 million acquisition price. By requiring the board to risk 
the turnaround in the interest of common holders, a rule of common 
maximization sacrifices enterprise value. 
The opposite problem can arise if the law permits a preferred-
controlled board to act solely in the interests of the preferred holders. 
Consider again the payout scenario in Hypothetical B, where a 
turnaround has better chances of succeeding but the preferred holders 
have no claim on value above the liquidation preference. In that case, 
the average expected value of the turnaround is $42.5 million for the 
enterprise as a whole, substantially exceeding the $30 million acquisi-
tion price.147  Unconstrained by fiduciary duties, a preferred-controlled 
board might sacrifice enterprise value by acting too conservatively and 
accepting the acquisition offer in the interests of preferred holders. 
Proponents of enterprise maximization have a seemingly clever 
solution to this apparently value-destroying conflict—they place the 
entity (rather than any subset of shareholders) at the center of the 
board’s duties. So oriented, the board evaluates each decision it makes 
by a single yardstick of enterprise value without any regard for the 
distribution of that value among investors.148 Thus, in Hypothetical D 
the board would be compelled to approve the sale because the offer 
price exceeded the average expected value of the turnaround, and in 
Hypothetical B, the board would be compelled to attempt the turn-
around because its average expected value exceeded the acquisition 
price.149 These decisions maximize combined welfare in the sense of pro-
ducing the most value from the entity in question. 
An opportunity-cost focus, however, complicates this tidy analysis 
by expanding our focus beyond the enterprise to opportunity costs that 
affect combined welfare more broadly conceived. Consider again Fund 
C, which chose to shut down Company C in order to focus on more 
promising portfolio companies.150 In that hypothetical, the pivot had an 
average expected value of $72 million for the enterprise as a whole, 
higher than the $30 million acquisition offer. Under a rule of enterprise 
maximization, the board would be compelled to attempt the pivot. But 
 
147. Note that the hypothetical, like others in this article, assumes that all 
parties are risk-neutral. See supra note 88. But in reality, significant 
dispersion of expected returns may in fact affect value for some parties. 
In other words, determining enterprise value may be far more complicated 
for courts than stylized examples suggest.  
148. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 14, at 1885–86 (discussing enterprise 
maximization); Baird & Henderson, supra note 18, at 1323-28 (noting case 
law discussing the concept of enterprise maximization). 
149. But see Strine, supra note 14, at 2037 (espousing the view that it is 
impractical for courts to discern enterprise value in this manner). 
150. See supra text accompanying notes 107–108. 
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doing so forecloses Fund C from redirecting its efforts to its more 
promising portfolio companies. In other words, it has a high opportunity 
cost to the fund that may very well outweigh the marginal value to 
common of continuing. 
The example illustrates that enterprise value is in fact a very 
incomplete measure of combined welfare. If we expand our focus just 
slightly to include effects on the fund’s entire portfolio, rather than 
limiting our focus to payouts from Company C, the parties maximize 
combined welfare by redeploying effort to more promising portfolio 
companies. Put another way, directing the preferred to squeeze more 
value from Company C is a misallocation of resources because the fund 
has a higher value alternative. If it is true, as proponents of enterprise 
maximization argue,151 that the entrepreneur and venture capital fund 
want to maximize combined welfare so there is more to divide between 
them, it is unclear why they would adopt such a narrow view of 
combined welfare.152 
Proponents of enterprise maximization might counter that parties 
can always strike a Coasian bargain—the venture capital fund can make 
a side payment to the common holders at the time a higher value 
alternative emerges for the fund. In fact, there is evidence that this type 
of pay-off occurs in the venture capital context.153 But there are also 
good reasons to think such “midstream” bargains are difficult to 
strike.154 More to the point, if a corporate default rule occasions too  
151. See supra text accompanying notes 145–146 (discussing the rationale for 
enterprise maximization). 
152. There is another more subtle way in which enterprise maximization may 
not serve the interests of either class of shareholders—common or 
preferred. In some cases, venture capital investors are motivated to 
embrace the same long-shot (and enterprise-value sacrificing) strategies 
as underwater common holders in order to satisfy investor expectations. 
See Cable, supra note 65, at 230 (discussing a rule of thumb that investors 
expect a twenty percent internal rate of return on an investment in a 
venture capital fund). If a fund manager has a relatively weak portfolio, 
he or she may need to gamble on the best of his or her remaining portfolio 
companies even if the expected value of those gambles falls below 
immediate acquisition offers. In other words, some venture capital 
managers have especially low opportunity costs of continuing with a 
portfolio company because they can only invest the limited partners’ 
money once, and they need several large successes to offset high failure 
rates for start-ups. Id. at 230–31. See also Darian M Ibrahim, The New 
Exit in Venture Capital, Vand. L. Rev. 1, 28-29 (2012) (discussing funds’ 
incentives to seek large exits).  
153. See Brian Broughman & Jesse Fried, Renegotiation of Cash Flow Rights in 
the Sale of VC-Backed Firms, 95 J. Fin. Econ. 384, 391 (2010) (observing 
instances in which common shareholders receive cash payouts in excess of 
contractual cash flow rights). 
154. See William W. Bratton, Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock 
and Corporate Control, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 891, 910 (2002) (identifying 
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many Coasian bargains, one has to begin questioning whether it really 
captures the majoritarian bargain. In theory, any rule (including 
common maximization) can be bailed out by Coasian bargains, but a 
majoritarian default aspires to be more than an arbitrary starting point. 
In the end, enterprise maximization—despite its elegance—loses at 
least some of its shine when one takes into account the whole portfolio. 
One might wonder whether the majoritarian bargain has a different 
logic. 
2. The Difference Between VCs and Entrepreneurs 
In addition to undermining the case for enterprise maximization, a 
focus on investors’ alternatives suggests a plausible story for why 
common maximization would be the majoritarian bargain. In short, a 
credible commitment to capital lock-in may be necessary to induce 
high-quality entrepreneurs to enter into venture capital bargains. 
In a passage that does not make any explicit normative claim, the 
Trados opinion states that equity capital is “permanent capital.”155 In 
support of this descriptive statement, the court cites to law review 
literature that provides a normative justification of capital “lock-in” 
through the corporate form.156 
In one of the cited articles, Margret Blair argues that capital lock-
in was in fact the core innovation of the corporate form because it 
helped induce the type of asset-specific investment necessary for 
increasingly complex production problems faced by businesses in the 
nineteenth century.157 Blair details how common forms of business 
association in the nineteenth century—sole proprietorships, partner-
ships, and joint stock companies—were inadequate for the scale of ind-
ustrial organizations emerging at the time.158 The primary shortcoming 
of these early entities was the ability of financial or other investors to 
 
frequently cited obstacles to corporate midstream bargains, such as 
endowment effects and collective-action problems). 
155. In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 37 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
156. See id. at 37 n.4. 
157. See Margaret M. Blair, Locking In Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved 
for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. Rev. 
387, 388–95 (2003) (discussing the concept of capital lock-in and its role 
in the historical origins of the corporate form). 
158. See id. at 404–23 (discussing sole proprietorships, partnerships, and joint 
stock companies). 
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withdraw unilaterally, thereby destroying value of specialized invest-
ments of labor and physical assets.159 Blair asserts that increasing avail-
ability of the corporate form essentially solved this problem with its 
perpetual existence and limited rights of investor withdrawal.160 
This historical account may tell us something about the conditions 
necessary to induce entrepreneurs into venture capital bargains. Entre-
preneurs are asked to dedicate themselves for years on end to a single 
enterprise with an unproven idea rather than applying and building 
their skills and knowledge towards proven technologies and business 
plans.161 The result may be a tailoring of their most valuable asset—
their human capital—in a very firm specific way.162 
Trados reminds us that venture capital funds are different. They 
operate on a model of diversification, giving them a ready destination 
(and incentive) to redeploy their efforts. Of course, they will also make 
some firm-specific investments of time. But fundamentally, their exper-
tise is of a more general nature. Venture capital managers have exper-
tise in “professional management,” meaning formal methodologies of 
accounting, finance, and management taught in business schools and 
intended to be applicable across a range of business settings.163  
159. See id. 
160. See id. at 423–37 (discussing the corporate form). For the view that the 
corporate form was not necessary for all that Blair ascribes to it, see Larry E. 
Ribstein, Should History Lock in Lock-in?, 41 Tulsa L. Rev. 523, 531-37 (2006). 
161. See Manuel A. Utset, Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic Behavior & Venture 
Survival: A Theory of Venture Capital-Financed Firms, 2002 Wis. L. 
Rev. 45, 57–58 (discussing non-compete obligations or other contractual 
penalties imposed on entrepreneurs for exiting a start-up). 
162. See Strine, supra note 14, at 2037 (noting that entrepreneurs make “company-
specific investments just as real as those made by the preferred”); Manuel A. 
Utset, High-Powered (Mis)Incentives and Venture-Capital Contracts, 7 Ohio 
St. Entrep. Bus. L.J. 45, 61–62 (2012) (discussing firm-specific 
contributions of human capital by entrepreneurs). Labor economist Edward 
Lazear explains how even skills that on their face appear transferable to other 
employers may lose their marketability when combined in idiosyncratic ways. 
He gives the example of a tax-preparation software company in which 
employees acquire an unusual mix of tax accounting knowledge and Java 
programming skills that are not easily transferable in combination. Edward 
P. Lazear, Firm-Specific Human Capital: A Skill-Weights Approach 2 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9679, 2003), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9679.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZUR9-FEE9]. 
163. See Utset, supra note 161, at 97–99 (discussing the role of venture capital 
managers in “professionalizing” start-ups); Korsmo, supra note 14, at n.31 
(“[Venture capital] investors are usually experienced professionals with formal 
academic training in business and finance and on-the-job training as apprentices 
at a venture fund or financial institution.”) (quoting 1 Joseph W. Bartlett, 
Equity Finance: Venture Capital, Buyouts, Restructurings and 
Reorganizations § 1.1, at 4 (2d ed. 1995)); supra note 108 (discussing the 
managerial contributions of venture capital managers). 
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A plausible way of understanding common maximization is as a 
bargain that is necessary to induce entrepreneurs to make firm specific 
investments in start-ups in a context where venture capital investors, 
if unconstrained by fiduciary duties, would operate under pervasive 
opportunity-cost conflicts. A rule of common maximization protects 
entrepreneurs by placing exit decisions under the control of a board 
charged with acting like fully committed entrepreneur. 
Admittedly, it cuts against grain of current commentary to focus 
on what is necessary to induce entrepreneurs to enter into venture 
capital contracts. In policy discussions, we tend to focus on what is 
necessary to induce financial investment in high-risk entrepreneurship. 
Policy makers refer to a “funding gap,” implying a large stable of 
investment ready start-ups without adequate capital.164 Blogs targeted 
at entrepreneurs recount the flood of funding proposals received by each 
venture capital fund annually and the long-shot odds faced by each 
entrepreneur.165 Similarly, proponents of enterprise maximization are 
careful to deem the rule a default so that venture capitalists can 
negotiate for additional protections to induce investment.166 
But there is a counter-narrative. Some within the venture capital 
industry believe that the asset class has grown too large and too many 
venture capital funds chase too few good opportunities.167 While this 
circumstance can be viewed as only a temporary disequilibrium, returns 
in the venture capital industry have always been driven by a small 
number of very large successes.168 Entrepreneurs may be easy to come 
by, but one would expect competition among venture capital firms for 
 
164. See Cable, supra note 65, at 207–08 (describing the funding gap that 
entrepreneurs face between the amount they can raise from personal 
resources (typically less than $500,000) and the minimum amounts 
venture capital funds are willing to invest (typically $5 million)). 
165. See Dileep Rao, Why 99.95% Of Entrepreneurs Should Stop Wasting 
Time Seeking Venture Capital, Forbes (July 22, 2013, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/dileeprao/2013/07/22/why-99-95-of- 
entrepreneurs-should-stop-wasting-time-seeking-venture-capital/  
[http://perma.cc/R7GA-WVH8] (stating that venture capital funds reject 98-
99% of business plans they receive). 
166. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 14, at 1895–99; Baird & Henderson, supra 
note 18, at 1328–33. 
167. E.g., Paul Kedrosky, Right-Sizing the U.S. Venture Capital Industry 
(2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1456431 
[http://perma.cc/4N34-AUXH] (arguing that there are too many venture 
capital funds relative to investment-ready start-ups); Mulchaney, et. al., 
supra note 109, at 3 (“Speculation among industry insiders is that the VC 
model is broken, despite occasional high-profile successes like Groupon, 
Zynga, LinkedIn, and Facebook in recent years.”). 
168. See supra note 65 (discussing the percentage of portfolio companies that 
accounts for the bulk of returns on venture capital investments). 
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the most talented entrepreneurs with the biggest ideas. Therefore, it 
seems at least plausible that lock-in is the majoritarian bargain.169 
To be clear, I am not necessarily arguing that this account of 
common maximization is more compelling than the case for enterprise 
maximization. Commentators identify costs of capital lock-in that may 
outweigh its benefits in particular contexts and market conditions.170 
The majoritarian bargain is hard to discern in this case.  
Still, there is value in simply providing some coherent story for 
common maximization. If nothing else, knowing the reason for common 
maximization might tell us something about the rule’s parameters. 
For example, one could read Pretrial Trados, with its compact 
reasoning, as requiring a preferred-controlled board to pursue extreme 
long-shot opportunities on behalf of the common. In other words, it is 
hard to see how a board could ever sell a company below liquidation 
value if the rule is as simple as act in the best interest of the common 
shareholders. The common will always prefer that the company live to 
see another day even if continuing is almost certain to destroy value 
that would go to the preferred holders. 
But a more palatable rule emerges if we recognize that common 
maximization rests on comparative opportunity costs and charges the 
board with making decisions like a fully committed entrepreneur in 
control of the company. Because even if venture capital funds tend to 
have higher opportunity costs because of their more generalizable skills 
and ready portfolio of alternatives, entrepreneurs have some opport-
unity costs of continuing to pour their efforts into a start-up with 
questionable prospects. Starting salaries for software engineers are 
rumored to exceed $165,000 in Silicon Valley.171 While an entrepreneur’s 
opportunity cost is difficult to measure precisely, courts should have in 
mind that they exist. If continuing with a company has an average  
169. See Strine, supra note 14, at 2037–39 (questioning why a rule that is 
favorable to preferred shareholders is more conducive to innovation than 
common maximization). 
170. Ibrahim, supra note 152 (arguing that “investor lock-in” was particularly 
problematic when the IPO market froze following the financial crisis); Ribstein, 
supra note 160 (“[C]apital lock-in may have significant costs in some contexts 
that must be balanced against any economic benefits. The cost-benefit tradeoff 
depends on the circumstances of particular firms and may vary over time.”). 
171. Julie Bort, In Silicon Valley, Salaries For Engineers Are Starting at 
$165,000, Business Insider (Oct. 16, 2013, 3:41 PM) http://www.business 
insider.com/record-salaries-for-valley-programmers-2013-10 [http://perma.cc/ 
YJB9-A6T2]. An entrepreneur will often collect a salary from a startup, but 
at a reduced rate. See Allison Shontell, Most Startup Founders Pay 
Themselves This Totally Reasonable Salary, Business Insider (May 28, 2014, 
10:37 A.M.) http://www.businessinsider.com/startup-founder-salaries-y- 
combinator-2014-5 [http://perma.cc/CJ67-945P] (reporting that company 
founders participating in a prominent incubator typically received salaries 
well below $100,000). 
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expected value below or only slightly above the liquidation preference, 
it is hard to see why a preferred-controlled board should be forced to 
continue when the founders themselves likely would not if they were in 
control.172 
III. Operationalizing Opportunity-Cost Conflicts 
For all of the questions Trados answers, a key question remains 
open: how aggressively will Delaware courts police opportunity-cost 
conflicts? Specifically, Trados is ambiguous regarding what facts 
presumptively trigger rigorous fairness review. This Part begins by ex-
plaining the important role that standard of review (the choice between 
fairness review and the business judgment rule) plays in Delaware 
fiduciary law. It concludes by endorsing a doctrine of opportunity-cost 
conflicts that would reserve fairness review for exceptional cases. 
A. Corporate Law’s Distinctive Balance 
More so than in other legal fields,173 corporate law articulates 
relatively demanding standards of conduct for fiduciaries (conduct 
standards) but then declines a role in enforcing those expectations due 
to deferential standards of review applied by courts (review stand-
ards).174 Most prominently, the business judgment rule prevents liti-
gants from challenging most actions by corporate fiduciaries. Even 
disastrous decision-making by a board member is ordinarily beyond 
 
172. In a crude sense, the entrepreneur’s opportunity cost is the expected 
financial payout (e.g., salary) of alternative employment or entrepreneurial 
ventures. But, admittedly, comparison of financial payouts is an incomplete 
model of the entrepreneur’s decision. For example, he or she may 
irrationally overvalue the startup’s prospects or derive subjective psychic 
benefits from its existence. See Utset, supra note 107 (discussing empirical 
studies suggesting that entrepreneurs are overly optimistic about their 
ventures). 
173. See Allen, supra note 41, at 1296 (“In most areas of law, standards of 
conduct and standards of review tend to conflate and become one and the 
same, but in corporate law the two standards often diverge.”); Melvin 
Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards 
of Review in Corporate Law, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 437, 437 (1993) (citing 
negligence in the context of personal injury law as an example of conflated 
standards of review and conduct). 
174. See Allen, supra note 41, at 1295 (comparing standards of conduct and 
standards of review); Eisenberg, supra note 173, at 437 (“A standard of 
conduct states how an actor should conduct a given activity or play a 
given role. A standard of review states the test a court should apply when 
it reviews an actor’s conduct to determine whether to impose liability or 
grant injunctive relief.”); Julian Velasco, The Role of Aspiration in 
Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 519, 521 (2012) 
(distinguishing standards of conduct and standards of review). 
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judicial scrutiny unless there are clear indicia of betrayal or impaired 
incentives on the part of the fiduciary.175 
Importantly, the business judgment rule does more than give 
defendants the benefit of the doubt at trial. Claims that are subject to 
the business judgment rule are ordinarily denied judicial process al-
together. Typically, a Delaware court will stay discovery pending the 
outcome of a motion to dismiss.176 A court will grant a motion to dismiss 
if it determines “‘with reasonable certainty that, under any set of facts 
that could be proven to support the claims asserted, the plaintiff would 
not be entitled to relief.’”177 Where courts apply the business judgment 
 
175. See Eisenberg, supra note 173, at 443 (“[A] director or officer will not be liable 
for a decision that resulted in a loss to the corporation, even if the decision is 
unreasonable, as long as the conditions of the business judgment rule have 
been met and the decision is rational.”); Velasco, supra note 174, at 547 
(stating that under the business judgment rule “evidence of a very bad 
decision is insufficient” and “plaintiffs must establish that the decision was 
utterly irrational and amounted to waste”). For the most part, the exceptions 
to this deferential approach are variations on the single theme of self-dealing, 
where courts apply more rigorous fairness review. E.g., Mills Acquisition Co. 
v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989) (scrutinizing a management 
buyout); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del 1983) (scrutinizing a 
cash-out merger of minority shareholders); Carsanero v. Bloodhound Tech., 
Inc., 65 A.3d 618 (Del. Ch. 2013) (scrutinizing financing transactions between 
a director and the corporation); Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1944) (scrutinizing business dealings between a corporation and its CEO’s 
wife). See generally Allen, supra note 41, at 1290 (stating that the duty of 
loyalty “addresses primarily (but not exclusively) situations involving self-
dealing”). A few other specialized situations that receive “intermediate 
scrutiny” round out the bulk of viable claims against fiduciaries in corporate 
law. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) 
(regarding takeover defenses); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985) (regarding certain sales of control). 
176. See Orloff v. Shulman, No. Civ.A. 852-N, 2005 WL 333240, at *1 (Del. Ch. 
Feb.2, 2005) (granting stay of discovery); In re McCrory Parent Corp., Civ. a. 
No. 12006, 1991 WL 137145, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 3, 1991) (denying stay of 
discovery and discussing circumstances under which Delaware courts grant such 
motions); Del. Trial Handbook 2:4 (“It is recognized that efficiency is 
promoted by a rule that, absent special circumstances, discovery should be 
stayed pending determination of a motion to dismiss where the grounds for the 
motion offer a reasonable expectation that if the motion is granted, litigation 
will be ended.”), http://www.delawgroup.com/delaware-trial-handbook- 
%C2%A7-24-motion-to-stay-discovery/ [http://perma.cc/4MSF-NXDQ]. The 
circumstances in which Delaware courts typically deny a motion to stay 
discovery are: “(1) where the motion does not offer a ‘reasonable expectation’ 
of avoiding further litigation, (2) where the plaintiff has requested interim 
relief, and (3) where the plaintiff will be prejudiced because ‘information may 
be unavailable later.’” Orloff, 2005 WL 333240, at *1 (citing In re McCrory, 
1991 WL 137145, at *1). 
177. Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 703 (Del. 2009) (quoting VLIW Tech., 
LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 840 A.2d 606, 610–11 (Del. 2003)). 
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rule, motions to dismiss are ordinarily granted and the proceeding ends 
before discovery; where courts apply entire fairness, motions to dismiss 
are ordinarily denied and discovery proceeds.178 
What accounts for this stark divergence of review and conduct 
standards in corporate law? One possible answer is that corporate 
litigation occurs in a distinctive context where the costs of allowing 
meritless litigation to proceed (false positives) exceed the costs of 
dismissing some claims that actually involve fiduciary misconduct (false 
negatives).179 In other words, fiduciary law may reflect a considered 
balance between policing managerial misconduct and preventing 
litigation abuse, and that balance may take into account the specific 
context in which shareholder litigation takes place. 
1. The Substantial Cost of Hearing Meritless Litigation 
For over seven decades, commentators have expressed concern that 
shareholder litigation is especially susceptible to strike suits—meritless 
claims brought for settlement value (and attorneys’ fees).180 Shareholder 
litigation exhibits a number of features that commentators associate 
with litigation waste. Corporate litigation often concerns high-stakes 
and time-sensitive matters, such as corporate acquisitions, giving a 
shareholder suit substantial hold-up value even if it lacks merit in the 
long run. The costs of litigation, including discovery burdens, often fall 
disproportionately on corporate defendants, giving suits nuisance value 
 
178. Lewis H. Lazarus, Standard of Review in Conflict Transactions, 26 Del. 
J. Corp. L. 911, 913–14 (2001).  
179. Another explanation is that courts are not well equipped to second-guess 
business decisions of fiduciaries, and mistaken determinations of liability 
would chill beneficial directorial and corporate activity. E.g., Allen, supra 
note 41, at 1296; Velasco, supra note 174, at n.153 (collecting cases). This 
view is contestable. First, a specialized business court like the Chancery 
Court may be relatively well equipped to scrutinize at least some types of 
business decisions. Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of 
Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 
U. Penn. L. Rev. 1619, 1696 (2001) (stating that Delaware judges may 
have expertise and credibility within certain realms of corporate practice). 
Also, one might question the importance of judicial competency because 
cases almost always settle and courts rarely adjudicate at trial. See infra 
note 196. It is even unclear how much the precedent established in 
adjudicated cases influences settlement. Cf. Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, 
How the Merits Matter, Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance and Securities 
Settlements, 157 U. Penn. L. Rev. 755, 787–91 (2009) (discussing 
empirical research revealing a complicated relationship among technical 
legal merits, “sex appeal” of a claim, and settlement amounts). 
180. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of 
Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 Vand. L. 
Rev. 133, 135–38 (2004) (discussing historical reform efforts). 
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at relatively low cost to plaintiffs.181 Dispersed shareholders may be in-
effective monitors of their attorneys, resulting in litigation that serves 
the interests of plaintiffs’ firms more than shareholders.182 The law is 
conducive to “cosmetic settlements”—such as agreements for nominal 
disclosure supplements or governance concessions—that provide a basis 
for recovery of attorneys’ fees without substantial benefit to share-
holders.183 The insurance companies that ultimately bear the cost of 
litigation may be ineffective monitors of litigation costs or settlement 
amounts.184 
Though it is tempting to give each plaintiff its day in court, these 
long-standing concerns about litigation abuse might help explain why 
corporate law not only views most potential fiduciary claims with 
suspicion but also denies those claims legal process altogether through 
pretrial motion practice. After all, strike suits are by definition frivolous 
and gain their leverage simply by threatening untimely or expensive 
litigation. A doctrine that only affected how courts view cases at trial 
might do little to curb meritless claims.185 Accordingly, courts develop 
proxies for merit—ascertainable fact patterns that are likely to signal 
managerial abuse—and apply them early in the litigation process so 
that only claims with a high probability of success survive. 
2. The Muted Effects of Dismissing Valid Claims 
While fear of litigation abuse might explain sparing use of judicial 
review, any proxy for merit will be imperfect. Is curbing litigation abuse  
181. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on 
Reform, 62 Ind. L.J. 625, 637 (1987) (citing securities class actions as an 
example of likely cost differentials between plaintiffs and defendants). 
182. See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 180, at 148 (“While in theory clients 
can and should control all litigation decisions, closely monitoring the 
actions of their attorneys, the reality in representative litigation is that 
no individual shareholder has a sufficiently large stake in the outcome of 
the case to spend much time monitoring the attorneys.”). 
183. See Coffee, supra note 181, at 634 (asserting that “cosmetic settlements 
tend to be a more pervasive problem in derivative actions and securities 
class actions than in product liability or mass tort actions”); Jill E. Fisch 
et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An 
Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 Tex. L. Rev. 557 
(2014) (finding that disclosures compelled by settlement do not affect 
voting results and therefore provide questionable benefit to shareholders). 
184. See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate 
Governance: The Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurer, 95 Geo L.J. 
1795, 1814–17 (2007) (explaining that D&O insurers do not select defense 
counsel under customary policy terms and, therefore, monitor costs and 
settlements less intensely than in other insurance contexts). 
185. See Strine, supra note 14, at 2035–36 (criticizing standards of review 
proposed by Bratton and Wachter because they would preclude motions 
to dismiss, allow discovery, and thereby give claims holdup value). 
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worth letting some incidents of managerial abuse fall through the 
cracks? In other words, shouldn’t we be equally concerned about the 
costs of false-negatives (i.e., cases that will be dismissed under deferen-
tial review standards even when the defendants in fact violated stand-
ards of conduct)? 
First, litigation operates in combination with a number of other 
mechanisms for policing managerial misconduct. Examples include the 
market for corporate control, disclosure-based regulation through 
federal securities laws, mandated governance features through federal 
securities laws and exchange requirements, private contracting, and 
reputational constraints.186 
In fact, according to an influential analysis by Edward Rock and 
Michael Wachter, the primary purpose of the corporate form is to 
incubate non-legal mechanisms for managing relationships among 
stakeholders.187 Examples include boardroom practices, corporate 
governance norms, compensation practices, and other elements of corp-
orate culture.188 These nonlegally enforceable rules and standards 
(NLERS) are most effectively disseminated and enforced through 
market dynamics and reputational constraints rather than judicial 
decisions.189 NLERS may be particularly strong in the corporate context 
because of the sustained interactions of corporate stakeholders, as 
opposed to one-off commercial transactions.190 
Second, even where judicial involvement can play a useful rule, it 
may not be necessary to provide legal remedies in every instance. 
Corporate fiduciaries may follow judicial guidance even without judicial 
enforcement. For example, social scientists have studied individuals’ 
motivations for legal compliance and concluded that fear of punishment 
is only one factor.191 Other motivations include perceptions of legiti-
macy, personal morality, social consequences, psychological inclination 
toward obedience and conformity, and altruistic impulses.192 Corporate-
 
186. See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 180, at 142–43 (describing a wide 
range of mechanisms for checking managerial abuse). 
187. Rock & Wachter, supra note 179, at 1621–22. 
188. Id. at 1642–43. 
189. See id. at 1645, 1649 (discussing how “competitive forces” and reputational 
concerns contribute to NLERS). 
190. See id. at 1669 (comparing corporate law to other professional malpractice 
settings). 
191. See Velasco, supra note 174, at 571–80 (noting that “‘normative perspectives’ 
of personal morality and legitimacy” and “social consequences” are also 
strong motivators). 
192. Id. 
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law scholar Julian Valesco relies on this literature in concluding that 
“the unenforced duty is a meaningful concept” in fiduciary law.193 
In sum, there are reasons to be sparing with judicial process in 
corporate law. In the corporate context, litigation is particularly sus-
ceptible to abuse and alternative mechanisms for influencing corporate 
conduct are particularly strong. 
3. Some Evidence of an Effective System 
It is difficult to reach a definite conclusion regarding whether 
corporate fiduciary law currently strikes an optimal balance between 
policing managerial and litigation abuse. Though there is substantial 
empirical literature considering the question, this research, by its own 
admission, faces very difficult methodological challenges such as how 
researchers can define and measure a claim’s “merit.”194 
There is, however, some indication that the system works well 
relative to other forms of shareholder litigation. Specifically, evidence 
suggests that Delaware class actions alleging breach of fiduciary duty 
(fiduciary class actions) occasion less litigation waste than class actions 
brought in federal court under federal securities law (securities class 
actions).195 Traditionally, many empirical studies of shareholder litig-
ation conflate different types of proceedings and find signs of litigation 
 
193. Id. at 580. 
194. E.g., Baker & Griffith, supra note 179, at 780–83 (discussing methodological 
challenges). 
195. The primary forms of shareholder litigation are securities class actions, 
derivative suits, and fiduciary class actions. See Thompson & Thomas, supra 
note 180, at 135–38 (noting an increase in “class action lawsuits filed under 
state law challenging director conduct” compared to derivative and securities 
fraud claims). Securities class actions are brought under federal securities law 
in federal court and typically allege inadequate disclosure by the corporation. 
Id. at 144. The other two forms of shareholder litigation typically allege breach 
of fiduciary duty by corporate managers and must be brought in state court. 
When the alleged misconduct harms the corporation as a whole, such as 
embezzlement by a corporate manager, claims are characterized as derivative 
and can be pursued by shareholders only if the board is unable (typically due 
to a conflict of interest) to itself pursue the matter. See Robert B. Thompson 
& Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of Derivative Lawsuits, 
57 Vand. L. Rev. 1747, 1758 (2004). Most other fiduciary-duty actions—
including those that allege harm to a particular group of shareholders or that 
challenge the price paid to shareholders in a merger transaction—are not 
subject to derivative procedures and are brought “directly” as fiduciary class 
actions. See Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031 (Del. 
2004); Edward P. Welch et al., Folk on the Delaware General 
Corporation Law at § 327.2 (discussing whether certain merger-related 
claims are treated as direct or derivative). Trados is an example of a fiduciary 
class action. In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 34 (Del. Ch. 2013) 
(describing the background of the litigation). 
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waste in the aggregate.196 In contrast, Robert Thompson and Randall 
Thomas studied a data set consisting of only fiduciary class actions, 
and they paint a rosier picture of such litigation.197 They found some 
evidence of litigation agency costs in the form of cookie-cutter 
complaints filed quickly and repeat plaintiffs.198 But they also found 
evidence of a better functioning litigation system such as (1) more 
significant monetary relief to shareholders199 and (2) settlement am-
ounts correlated with indicators of managerial abuse, suggesting the 
“merits matter” in this context.200 
Arguably, this evidence suggests that the structure of fiduciary 
law—sparing use of fairness review and a robust business judgment 
rule—is doing some helpful work in balancing efforts to police manager-
ial misconduct and litigation abuse. If nothing else, one might simply 
conclude that Delaware fiduciary duty law is likely to influence the 
balance between policing managerial misconduct and mitigating litig-
ation abuse. And in the absence of convincing evidence that the law 
currently leans too far in favor of one or the other, courts should try to 
implement Trados’s novel theory in a manner that maintains the 
current balance. 201 
B. Lessons from Entrenchment: The Other-Facts Standard 
In considering how to implement opportunity-cost conflicts consis-
ent with the guidance above, it is useful to review how courts treat a 
close cousin: entrenchment claims. An entrenchment claim alleges that 
 
196. Thompson and Thomas review empirical research that combines securities 
class actions, derivative suits, and fiduciary class actions. The studies indicate 
that a majority of these shareholder suits settle. See Thompson & Thomas, 
supra note 180, at 158–59 (reviewing empirical research of shareholder 
litigation by Roberta Romano and others). Most of the rest are dismissed or 
voluntarily withdrawn. Id. at 158. Among the very small number of cases 
that go to trial, almost none result in judgments for plaintiffs. Id. at 159. 
Settlement payouts to shareholders tend to be small as a percentage of share 
price, with a large amount going towards attorneys’ fees. Id. at 159–61. 
197.  Id. at 138. 
198. Id. 
199. Id.  
200. Id. at 139. 
201. Based on recent evidence, there is little to suggest litigation abuse is fading 
from concern. A recent study of large mergers produced striking statistics. Over 
97% of such transactions in 2013 were challenged by shareholder litigation. 
The study reported that nearly 85% of settlements provided for disclosure 
concessions (and attorneys fees) of questionable value and no monetary payout 
to shareholders. Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Takeover  
Litigation in 2013 (Ohio State Univ., Working Paper No. 236, 2014), 
 http://ssrn.com/abstract=2377001 [http://perma.cc/2PTW-8RUH]. 
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board members scuttled a sale in order to keep their jobs.202 It is 
basically the flip-side of the opportunity-cost conflict at issue in Trados, 
where directors were criticized for selling the company in order to focus 
on other opportunities. 
Entrenchment and opportunity-cost claims share common charact-
eristics. They are, in a sense, ubiquitous in corporate acquisitions. Every 
fiduciary either lacks higher value alternatives and, there-fore, operates 
under an entrenchment conflict, or has higher value alternatives and, 
therefore, operates under an opportunity-cost conflict. If courts liberally 
inferred such conflicts at the motion-to-dismiss stage, fairness review 
would be common and the business judgment rule would have little role 
in corporate acquisitions. Therefore, it is useful to con-sider how 
Delaware courts view entrenchment claims at the motion-to dismiss 
stage.203 
Gantler v. Stephens204 is an instructive case. In Gantler, the plaintiff 
claimed that board members pursued a corporate restructuring instead 
of a merger because only the former would permit them to keep their 
jobs.205 The Delaware Supreme Court overturned the lower court’s 
dismissal of the claims but did so in a way that still acknowledged the 
need for meaningful scrutiny at early stages of the proceeding.206 The 
court began by noting that even the traditionally deferential standard 
for a motion to dismiss has its limits: 
In reviewing the grant or denial of a motion to dismiss, we view 
the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 
accepting as true its well-pled allegations and drawing all reason-
able inferences that logically flow from those allegations. We do 
not, however, blindly accept conclusory allegations unsupported 
 
202. See infra text accompanying notes 204–208 (describing an example 
entrenchment case). 
203. By use of the term “entrenchment,” I do not mean to invoke cases 
employing the court’s intermediate level of scrutiny, though those cases 
are sometimes associated with the concept of entrenchment. The courts’ 
approach to those intermediate-scrutiny cases is, however, similar in effect 
to the other-facts standard described in this subpart, at least when the 
corporation’s charter includes a customary exculpatory clause that 
extinguishes duty of care claims. E.g., In re Morton’s Rest. Grp., Inc., 74 
A.3d 656, 672–76 (Del. Ch. 2013) (dismissing complaint). See also Lewis 
Lazarus, Chancery Court Dismisses Revlon and Quasi-Appraisal Claim, 
Del. Bus. Lit. Report (July 24, 2014), http://www.delawarebusiness 
litigation.com/2014/07/articles/articles/chancery-court-dismisses-revlon-
and-quasi-appraisal-claim/ [http://perma.cc/A9NL-U2ZH]. 
204. 965 A.2d 695 (2009). 
205. Id. at 699–703. 
206. Id. at 703–07. 
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by specific facts, nor do we draw unreasonable inferences in the 
plaintiffs’ favor.207 
The court then noted the special problems associated with 
ubiquitous types of conflicts such as entrenchment: 
Here, the plaintiffs allege that the Director Defendants had a 
disqualifying self-interest because they were financially motivated 
to maintain the status quo. A claim of this kind must be viewed 
with caution, because to argue that directors have an entrench-
ment motive solely because they could lose their positions follow-
ing an acquisition is, to an extent, tautological. By its very nature, 
a board decision to reject a merger proposal could always enable 
a plaintiff to assert that a majority of the directors had an 
entrenchment motive. For that reason, the plaintiffs must plead, 
in addition to a motive to retain corporate control, other facts 
sufficient to state a cognizable claim that the Director Defendants 
acted disloyally.208 
The court then applied this standard of “other facts” to the case at 
hand.209 The court determined that the plaintiff met the standard by 
pointing to specific business relationships that were at risk if the 
company was sold, such as one director’s ownership of a heating and 
air conditioning company that counted the bank as a major customer.210 
Gantler offers two lessons for future judicial analysis of opport-
unity-cost conflicts. First, only facts that strongly indicate impaired 
incentives should trigger fairness review. Second, those facts must be 
ascertained early in the litigation process in order to warrant discovery. 
To preserve corporate law’s current balance, courts should evaluate 
claims of opportunity-cost conflict consistently with these principles. 
As described further below, that means requiring plaintiffs to plead 
something more than a disappointing result for plaintiff shareholders. 
C. What Qualifies as Other Facts? 
What should qualify as “other facts” sufficient to sustain an opport-
unity-cost claim? To an extent, the answer will depend on context. As 
described above, an opportunity-cost conflict could arise in connection 
with any active investor.211 
Nonetheless, we can start bracketing the possibilities by considering 
categories of evidence presented in Trados. In that case, the court con-
sidered three types of evidence: testimony revealing improper intent, 
 
207. Id. at 703–04 (footnote omitted). 
208. Id. at 707. 
209.  Id. 
210. Id. at 707–08. 
211. See supra text accompanying notes 113–114. 
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industry-wide generalizations regarding behavior of venture capital 
investors, and indirect or circumstantial evidence of improper intent. 
This subpart concludes that direct evidence of intent will be the 
most compelling other facts, and industry-wide generalizations are 
unlikely to qualify as other facts. Between those two extremes lie 
indirect and circumstantial indications of conflict, which are unlikely to 
qualify as other facts ordinarily but also difficult to rule out altogether. 
1. Direct Evidence of Intent Qualifies 
The most clearly qualifying facts would be statements of intent 
consistent with the shut-down dynamic. As described above, at least 
one Trados director essentially admitted that he allowed his time-
allocation preferences (his desire to spend time on other portfolio 
companies) to affect exit decisions that were supposed to be made on 
behalf of the common holders.212 This may be a perfectly understandable 
impulse for an active portfolio investor. But under the reasoning of 
Trados, it is an impulse that a fiduciary is expected to suppress when 
making a decision in a fiduciary capacity.213 
If a future court had similar evidence before it when considering a 
motion to dismiss,214 that would be a compelling basis for letting the 
litigation move forward under the other-facts standard. 
Of course, this raises the question of how plaintiffs will uncover 
such evidence at the outset of a proceeding and prior to discovery. In 
many cases, an entrepreneur will have board representation and be 
privy to discussions and correspondence regarding exit decisions.  
Shareholders also have shareholder inspection rights that permit them 
access to documents concerning board decisions.215 Plaintiffs in sec-
urities class actions have used a variety of investigative techniques to 
uncover facts without the use of discovery.216 Some plaintiffs alleging 
opportunity-cost conflicts may even have the benefit of some discovery 
prior to a motion-to-dismiss. For example, the plaintiffs in Trados con-
ducted significant discovery in connection with their appraisal claim.217  
 
212. See supra text accompanying notes 81–82 (summarizing testimony at trial). 
213. As stated above, this does not mean the fiduciary is forced to allocate time to 
the subject company—he or she could resign as a fiduciary. See supra note 118. 
214. It does not appear that Ghandi’s incriminating statements were available to 
the court in hearing the motion to dismiss. Therefore, the court might have 
dismissed the claim under the recommendations of this article. See infra Part 
IV.B. 
215. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 220 
216. See Baker & Griffith, supra note 179, at 769-71 (discussing investigative 
techniques of plaintiffs’ lawyers, such as former-employee interviews). 
217. See Trados, 73 A.3d at 34. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 1·2015 
Opportunity-Cost Conflicts in Corporate Law 
100 
In other cases, plaintiffs obtain some abbreviated discovery in 
connection with requests for injunctive relief.218 
In short, plaintiffs are not wholly without means to uncover a 
smoking gun. 
2. Industry-Wide Generalizations Do Not 
Industry-wide generalizations are another candidate for other facts. 
For example, perhaps future courts can presume that every director 
affiliated with a venture capital fund labors under a significant 
opportunity-cost conflict because the shut-down dynamic is an observed 
pattern of behavior in the venture capital industry.219 
At first blush, this approach has some appeal as a potentially 
effective compromise between policing managerial misconduct and 
limiting strike suits. If opportunity-cost conflicts are especially 
prevalent in certain realms of economic activity, perhaps courts should 
take a harder look at cases arising in those contexts. Both precedent 
and policy, however, work against this approach. 
First, Trados itself cautions against industry-wide generalizations 
in a portion of the opinion unrelated to any of the analysis in this 
article. The court found that a supposedly independent director (one 
not employed by any venture capital fund) was in the pocket of the 
preferred holders because he valued having a business relationship with 
prominent venture capital funds.220 In so holding, the court referenced 
“the web of interrelationships that characterizes the Silicon Valley 
start-up community” and cited legal scholarship to that effect.221 The 
court, however, clarified that “[a]t trial, the plaintiff could not rely on 
general characterizations of the VC ecosystem.”222 Instead, the court 
required the plaintiff to prove that the director in question “was not 
disinterested or independent in this case.”223 
In a subsequent case involving sale of a start-up company, the Del-
aware Chancery Court reiterated that general characterizations are in-
sufficient to increase judicial scrutiny. In Chen v. Howard-Anderson,224 
the plaintiff claimed that board members were conflicted due to their  
218. E.g., In re Morton’s Restaurant Group, 74 A.3d 656, 662 (Del. Ch. 2013); 
see also Del. Ch., Court of Chancery Guidelines for Expedited Discovery in 
Advance of a Preliminary Injunction Hearing, http://courts.delaware.gov/ 
chancery/docs/PIDiscoveryGuidelines.pdf [http://perma.cc/4L8F-S657] 
(last visited Oct. 08, 2015). 
219. See supra note 107 (listing legal scholarship discussing the shut-down dynamic). 
220. In re Trados, 73 A.3d at 54–55. 
221. Id. at 54. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. (emphasis added). 
224. 87 A.3d 648 (Del. 2014). 
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affiliation with venture capital funds that were near the end of their 
ten-year term.225 The plaintiff argued that the looming termination date 
skewed the funds’ incentives by necessitating liquidation of the funds’ 
holdings.226 Citing Trados, the court rejected that argument and stated:  
It is not enough . . . for a plaintiff simply to argue in the abstract 
that a particular director has a conflict of interest because she is 
affiliated with a particular type of institution. There must be 
evidence sufficient to permit a finding that the director in fact 
faced a conflict in the specific case.227 
Based on this article’s reasoning, there are good reasons why courts 
have been skeptical of hinging judicial scrutiny on industry-wide 
generalizations. To understand a fund’s true incentives, we would need 
to know how the fund viewed the company’s prospects in relation to 
the rest of its portfolio, the prospects for raising a new fund with a new 
portfolio of companies, and the fund managers’ prospects for exiting the 
venture capital business altogether.228 In short, it is one thing to observe 
a pattern of conduct that sometimes results in shut-down of a viable 
entity and quite another to infer from every disappointing transaction 
that investors abandoned the company for greener pastures. 
3. Indirect Evidence of Intent Is Difficult to Imagine 
According to the preceding subparts, clear statements of intent and 
industry-wide generalizations are the easy cases. The former is a com-
pelling additional fact; the latter is not. 
Between these easy cases are various forms of indirect or circum-
stantial evidence of opportunity-cost conflict. While it is hard to rule 
out a compelling collection of indirect facts, it is hard to think of an 
example that would not undermine the standard’s purpose of meaning-
fully screening meritless litigation. 
For example, Pretrial Trados emphasized that the company had 
enjoyed some positive business developments.229 In the year prior to the 
sale, the company obtained additional debt financing and beat revenue 
projections under the guidance of a new CEO that was selected by the 
venture capital funds.230 But what do these signs of a possible upswing 
really tell us? At most, they suggest Trados was not an altogether lost 
 
225. Id. at 671. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. 
228. See supra Part II.A. 
229. In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 1512-CC, 2009 WL 2225958 at *3,*14 
(Del. Ch. July 24, 2009). 
230. Id. 
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cause, which is something we probably already knew from the fact that 
a purchaser was willing to spend $60 million to buy the company. 
Another influential fact in Trados was diminishing time 
commitment by one of the allegedly conflicted directors.231 This gets 
closer to the gravamen of an opportunity-cost conflict—withdrawal of 
effort from a fiduciary relationship in order to pursue better altern-
atives. There are at least two problems with focusing on reduced time 
commitment, however. 
First, it is unclear what the proper benchmark is for a board 
member’s time commitment. For example, it is plausible to think that, 
when fully engaged, a board member affiliated with a venture capital 
investor is more active than the average board member.232 Should that 
board member then be held accountable for reducing involvement to 
what might be more typical levels? 
Second, if reduced effort alone is a qualifying additional fact, what 
separates a Trados claim from a simple negligence (duty of care) claim 
that would ordinarily be governed by the business judgment rule? It 
may be inevitable that the line between care and loyalty occasionally 
blurs.233 But given what is at stake when the court categorizes a claim 
as sounding in loyalty or care, courts should be wary of too quickly 
equating shirking with disloyalty.234 
Looking beyond Trados, what other type of facts, short of direct 
evidence of intent, might qualify as other facts? In theory, a court could 
draw inferences from a portfolio investor’s or parent corporation’s 
internal valuations or assessments of alternatives. Such assessments 
may suggest a prioritization of the fiduciary’s efforts. But such reports 
may be produced according to industry conventions that fail to capture 
the fiduciary’s subjective assessments. Managers of venture capital 
funds, for example, provide their limited partners with periodic 
estimates of portfolio-company values in accordance with agreed upon 
valuation methods that may not reflect their subjective assessments.235 
So while it is difficult to rule out some combination of indirect 
evidence that together makes a compelling case for an opportunity-cost 
conflict, it is equally hard to think of a good example. 
 
231. See In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 52 (Del. Ch. 2013) 
(stating that one director stopped attending meetings in person). 
232. See supra note 108 (describing the active involvement of venture capital 
investors). 
233. See supra notes 34–40 (discussing overlap between care and loyalty). 
234. See supra notes 34–40 (exploring the conceptual differences between 
claims arising out of care and claims arising out of loyalty). 
235. See Association Française des Investisseurs en Capital et al., 
International Private Equity and Venture Capital Valuation 
Guidelines 7 (2012); see supra text accompanying notes 122-136 
(discussing the subjective nature of opportunity costs). 
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IV. Potential Objections 
The first three parts of this article argued that courts should rarely 
invoke Trados’s novel theory of opportunity-cost conflicts, despite its 
conceptual value. This Part anticipates objections and offers brief 
responses. 
A. Opportunity-Cost Analysis Was Dicta in Trados 
This article takes the position that opportunity-cost analysis was 
integral to the court’s selection of fairness review. It does so for several 
reasons. First, that is a natural reading of the Trados opinion; why else 
would the court engage in such elaborate and novel reasoning? Second, 
the law has never required perfect incentive alignment,236 and quasi-
residual rights go far in mitigating incentive distortion.237  
This is not the only plausible reading of Trados. One could read 
the case to say that the mere ambiguity of quasi-residual incentives 
triggers fairness review at the moderate downside. The court stated 
that opportunity-cost conflicts “reinforce” incentives created by quasi-
residual cash flow rights without explicitly indicating whether either 
source of conflict alone is sufficient to trigger fairness review.238 
Even if the opportunity-cost conflict was dicta in Trados, the 
concept still warrants serious analysis. It is conceivable that future 
plaintiffs will invoke the concept of opportunity-cost conflicts in other 
contexts, such as an all common capital structure.239 Eventually courts 
may be called upon to assess whether an opportunity-cost conflict, 
standing alone, is a viable claim. Put another way, sometimes dicta 
matters because it foreshadows the future direction of the law.240 
B. Why Wasn’t Trados Dismissed? 
In Trados, the plaintiffs' best evidence was testimony of one 
director at trial.241 In fact, it is not clear that any other evidence cited 
in Trados was sufficient under the other-facts standard described in this  
236. See supra text accompanying notes 98–102  
237. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing how conversion rights align incentives when 
there is a meaningful chance at significant upside); supra Part I.B.3 
(discussing how participation rights align incentives when there could be 
moderate increases in enterprise value); supra Part I.C (discussing the 
largely aligned interests of common shareholders and venture-capital 
investors); supra text accompanying notes 96–97 (discussing the limited 
range of outcomes in which common and venture capital preferred conflict). 
238. In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 50 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
239. See supra notes 1113–1124 and accompanying text. 
240. Mohsen Manesh, Damning Dicta: The Default Duty in Delaware, 39 J. 
Corp. L. 35, 57–62 (2013) (discussing use of dicta by Delaware courts). 
241. See supra note 1132. 
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article.242  How then did the plaintiffs' claims survive motion to dismiss 
in Pretrial Trados? 
In short, this article argues that the plaintiffs’ claims should have 
been dismissed contrary to the outcome of Pretrial Trados. Where did 
Pretrial Trados go wrong?  One possibility is that the court focused 
only on the potential conflict between residual and quasi-residual cash 
flow rights, contrary to the position articulated in Part IV.A above.  
Alternatively, maybe the court implicitly relied on opportunity-cost 
analysis and concluded there was sufficient indirect evidence of 
improper intent, contrary to the analysis in Part III.C.3 above. In either 
case, this article views Trados as a necessary improvement to the more 
cursory reasoning of Pretrial Trados. 
C. Contracting or Processing Around Trados 
This article argues for a cautious approach to judicially enforced 
fiduciary duties, primarily out of concern for litigation abuse.243 One 
might argue that this caution is unnecessary because parties to fin-
ancing transactions can follow ratification procedures (approval by in-
dependent directors) to cleanse any conflict or contract around Trados 
through negotiated shareholder rights.244 Bratton and Wachter, how-
ever, ably identify the difficulties preferred holders will encounter 
contracting or processing around Trados. 
Even if independent directors are reasonably available,245 it will be 
hard for those directors to conclude beyond litigation risk that a pivot 
lacks significant value to the common holders to whom duties are 
owed.246 As Bratton and Wachter note, even a fairness opinion that pegs 
enterprise value well below the preferred liquidation preference pro-
bably must admit to some nontrivial chance at a turnaround.247 Under 
Trados, such an opinion risks making the plaintiffs’ case.248  
242. See Part III.C.3 (discussing alleged indications of opportunity-cost conflict 
in Trados and Pretrial Trados). 
243. See supra Part III.C (suggesting that courts should scrutinize 
opportunity-cost conflicts only in cases with extraordinary evidence); see 
infra Part IV.A (suggesting that conflicts between the cash flow rights of 
common and preferred are mild and should not trigger fairness review). 
244. E.g., Strine, supra note 14, at 2040 (stating that Delaware’s jurisprudence 
relating to preferred stock “creates good incentives for parties with the 
powerful leverage of preferred stockholders to get their rights where they 
should—in the contract”). 
245. Trados’s skepticism towards the supposedly independent director in that 
case highlights the difficulty of the task. See supra Part III.C.2. 
246. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 14, at 1888–89 (discussing procedural 
workarounds). 
247. Id. at 1888. 
248. Id. 
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Ex ante contracts are no panacea either. Because an opportunity-
cost conflict sounds in loyalty rather than care, such a claim cannot be 
released in the company’s charter.249 Instead, the parties must rely on 
less direct contractual solutions at the shareholder level. 
A minority of venture capital financings include redemption rights 
that amount to an eventual shutdown right in favor of the venture 
capital investor.250 This is an extremely blunt instrument—a nuclear 
option at a date certain in favor of investors. With so much uncertainty 
at the time of contracting, it is no wonder that such fixed time limits 
for a venture are unpopular. 
Drag-along rights are more common in venture capital financings.251 
Such rights permit a specified set of shareholders to compel other share-
holders to vote in favor of a sale.252 Though helpful in overcoming some 
holdout problems, drag-along rights do not avoid the statutory require-
ments for board approval of a merger.253 As a result, drag-along rights 
cannot be exercised without exposing the board to Trados claims.254 
The foregoing contracting challenges are an additional reason—on 
top of litigation abuse—for weaker fiduciary restraints. More rigorous 
fiduciary review might foreclose governance structures to which entre-
preneurs and investors might resort in the face of noncontractible prob-
lems. For example, Brian Broughman models how a customary board 
configuration featuring an independent and mutually agreed upon 
director as tie breaker can lead to optimal exit decisions.  This result 
 
249. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 102(b)(7) (2015) (permitting elimination of 
director liability for duty of care violations but not duty of loyalty violations). 
250. Cooley LLP, 2014 Venture Financing in Review—A Banner Year 
for Deal Volume and Invested Capital 7 (2015), http://www.cooley. 
com/venture-financing-report-2014-year-in-review [http://perma.cc/RE7N-
KT4Q]. 
251. Id. at 6. 
252. See Maynard & Warren, supra note 51, at 665–66 (discussing drag-
along rights). 
253. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 251 (2015) (requiring board approval for a 
merger). 
254. In response to Pretrial Trados, Silicon Valley lawyers (acting through the 
National Venture Capital Association) tried to enhance conventional drag-
along rights by adding a contractual “sale right.” Bratton & Wachter, supra 
note 14, at 1892. The sale right requires the company to hire an investment 
banker and conduct a sale process, and gives the exercising shareholders a 
redemption right at the highest bid obtained. Id. But such a provision 
necessarily falls short of compelling a sale—that would require board approval 
and ensnare the directors in Trados analysis. As Bratton and Wachter note, 
“[r]edemption in lieu of a merger is not the same as a merger.” Id. 
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obtains even if the directors act in self-interested ways that might 
offend a more robust version of fiduciary loyalty.255 
D. When Can a Board Pull the Plug? 
If a venture-capital fund’s opportunity costs are inappropriate 
motivation for selling or shutting down a company, what would be an 
appropriate motivation?  Does Trados require a board to let a company 
limp along indefinitely just to appease common-holding entrepreneurs? 
Trados does not compel a board to prolong the life of a company 
for the purpose of generating private benefits for entrepreneurs. Salary 
and individual prestige may motivate entrepreneurs to continue even 
when there is no meaningful chance of company value exceeding the 
preferred holders’ liquidation preference.  In that circumstance, a board 
(even one controlled by venture-capital investors) is justified in termin-
ating the project over the entrepreneur’s objections. Without smoking-
gun evidence of improper intent,256 a court should give deference to a 
reasonably informed determination that common-stock value is near 
zero. 
E. Heightened Pleading Standards Haven’t Worked 
On its face, the other-facts standard resembles heightened pleading 
standards such as those enacted by the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995257 (PLSRA) or mandated by recent judicial opinions 
such as Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly258 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.259 Some 
commentators question whether those reforms have been helpful in 
distinguishing between meritless and valid claims.260 
 
255. Broughman, supra note 106, at 480–86. 
256. See supra Part III.C.1 (discussing “direct evidence of intent”). 
257. The PSLRA enacted heightened pleading requirements, modified procedures 
for selecting lead plaintiffs, and narrowed discovery rights in securities class 
actions. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u (Supp. I 1995–96). 
258. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). There is some disagreement whether Twombly itself 
constitutes a “heightened” pleading standard, but together with Iqbal the 
current pleading regime is generally considered more demanding than what 
preceded. See Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 Mich L. 
Rev. 53, 65 (2010) (“The only study currently available of Twombly and Iqbal 
together finds that dismissal rates have increased across the board . . . .”). 
259. 556 U.S. 662 (2008). 
260. E.g., Alex Reinert, The Cost of Heightened Pleading, 86 Ind. L.J. 119 
(2011) (presenting an empirical analysis of the effects of Twombly and 
Iqbal and concluding that the effects have been more random than merit-
based); Stephen J. Choi et al., The Screening Effect of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act, 6 J. Empirical L. Stud. 35 (2009) 
(presenting evidence of PLSRA’s effects and concluding, “Congress’s 
efforts to discourage frivolous litigation may have succeeded,” but that 
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Unlike a wide-ranging pleading hurdle, the other-facts standard 
resides in a broader doctrinal context of review standards. If this system 
of review standards works properly, litigants face additional hurdles 
only with respect to fact patterns where risk of litigation abuse is likely 
to outweigh risk of managerial abuse. For other fact patterns—where 
there is ascertainable and heightened risk of managerial abuse—
plaintiffs have easier access to courts. That is a different, and perhaps 
more promising, approach than the PLSRA’s or Twombley’s broadly 
applicable pleading hurdles. Put another way, the backdrop of 
substantive law affects how pleading hurdles operate.261 
F. Plaintiffs Can Plead Anything 
Tacking the other direction, one might view the other-facts 
standard as too lenient. The standard does not require proving any 
particular facts—just pleading them. What prevents a plaintiff from 
manufacturing facts just to get over the pleading hurdle?262 
Both ethics rules and rules of civil procedure require that a lawyer 
have some basis for including facts in a complaint.263 While these may 
be under-enforced requirements,264 changes in filing patterns before and 
 
success comes at the price of “discouraging securities fraud class actions 
that would likely have been deemed meritorious prior to the PSLRA”). 
261. Cf. Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76 
Tex. L. Rev. 1749, 1771 (1998) (providing examples of when substantive 
elements of a tort or other claim might provide a framework for “tailored 
scrutiny of the pleadings”). 
262. Cf. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 14, at 1889 (“[N]othing prevents a 
lawyer from drafting the same ‘might have waited’ complaint that survived 
a motion to dismiss in Trados—maybe waiting a year would have yielded 
$75 million. Such a claim is as hard to falsify as it is easy to draft.”). 
263. Ethical rules require that there be a basis in fact for any proceeding. See 
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 3.1 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2013) (“A 
lawyer shall not bring . . . a proceeding . . . unless there is a basis in law and 
fact for doing so that is not frivolous.”); Del. Rules of Prof’l Conduct. 
r. 3.1 (2003) (including language identical to the model rules). Rules of civil 
procedure provide that every time a lawyer files a complaint he or she certifies 
that “to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed 
after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances . . . the factual 
contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely 
have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further 
investigation or discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b); See also Del. Ct. Ch. 
R. 11(b) (using similar language). 
264. In particular, ethical standards regarding frivolous complaints appear to 
be a rarely used tool. See Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Civil 
Rule 11 and Lawyer Discipline: An Empirical Analysis Suggesting 
Institutional Choices in the Regulation of Lawyers, 37 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 
765, 795–797 (2004) (discussing the low frequency of disciplinary referrals 
in connection with Rule 11 sanctions). 
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after PSLRA, Twombly, and Iqbal suggest that litigants are constrained 
in what they can plead.265 
G. Fix Civil Procedure Instead 
Concern about litigation abuse motivates this article’s recommend-
ations. In the long run, more squarely procedural reforms might be the 
most effective way to balance the courts’ interests in policing 
managerial and litigation abuse. For example, civil-procedure scholars 
have suggested reformulating the discovery system266 and corporate-law 
scholars have proposed new standards for awarding attorneys fees to 
discourage cosmetic settlements.267 
Nothing in this article precludes such reform. For now, courts have 
to decide what to do with Trados’s novel theory without the benefit of 
those initiatives. This article advocates a cautious approach. 
H. Entrepreneurs Don’t Litigate Much 
Some observers have noted an anti-litigation norm in Silicon 
Valley.268 In addition, some of the factors driving heightened concern 
about litigation abuse might not apply in the context of a privately 
held company with relatively few shareholders.269 
But recent cases still evidence a willingness to bring suit against 
venture capital investors.270 And many of the factors motivating  
265. See supra note 260 (citing empirical analysis of heightened pleading 
requirements). 
266. E.g., Dodson, supra note 258, at 68–85 (proposing discovery reforms tailored 
to the new pleading regime, including circumscribed pre-suit investigative 
discovery with cost-shifting mechanisms); see Thomas Y. Allman, The 2015 
Civil Rules Package As Approved By the Judicial Conference, Am. Bar 
Ass’n (March 11, 2015), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
administrative/litigation/materials/2015-sac/written_materials/5_1_2015
_summary_of_rule_package.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/4GAX-
VSP4] (describing ongoing efforts at discovery reform by the Committee on 
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference). 
267. E.g., Sean J. Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit: How to Fix 
Shareholder Litigation by Shifting the Doctrine on Fees, 56 B.C. L. Rev. 
1, 46–59 (2015) (proposing changes to doctrines under which attorneys 
are awarded fees for procuring a benefit for shareholders). 
268. Mark C. Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, The Hired Gun as Facilitator: 
Lawyers and the Suppression of Business Disputes in Silicon Valley, 21 
L. & Soc. Inquiry 679, 699–702 (1996). 
269. For example, a more concentrated shareholder base may have an easier 
time monitoring class counsel. See supra note 182 (discussing monitoring 
problems in public company shareholder litigation). 
270. The following recent Delaware cases involve venture capital defendants: 
Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648 (Del. 2014); In re Trados Inc. 
S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013); Carsanaro v. Bloodhound 
Tech., Inc., 65 A.3d 618 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
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shareholder litigation do pertain in this context, including insurance 
dynamics, the potential for hold-up value, and the disproportionate cost 
to defendants of discovery.271 One might even project increased 
litigation against venture capital funds in the near future, as investment 
levels increase and stakes grow higher.272 Finally, though the concept of 
opportunity-cost conflict emerged in the venture capital context, it is 
not limited to that setting.273 
Conclusion 
Decades ago, Melvin Eisenberg summarized the state of Delaware 
fiduciary law as follows: 
If directors or officers who violate the standards of reasonableness 
and fairness sometimes escape liability because of a less demand-
ing standard of review, it is not because they have acted properly, 
but because utilizing standards of review that were fully con-
gruent with the relevant standards of conduct would impose 
greater costs than the costs of letting some persons who violated 
their standards of conduct escape liability.274 
Most instances of opportunity-cost conflict are likely to fit the 
pattern. Trados provides a coherent argument for why a fiduciary 
should suppress the shut-down dynamic. But rooting out every trans-
gression through litigation hardly seems worth the cost. 
 
 
 
271. See supra text accompany notes 179–184 (describing features of corporate 
litigation that may contribute to litigation abuse). 
272. See Lizette Chapman, ‘Unicorn’ Startups Say High Valuations Justified, Citing 
Big Growth Ahead, Wall St. J. (May 7, 2015, 4:25 PM) http://blogs. 
wsj.com/venturecapital/2015/05/07/unicorn-startups-say-high-valuations- 
justified-citing-big-growth-ahead/ [http://perma.cc/5YZ9-N8CB] (providing 
examples of venture-backed companies with pre-IPO valuations in excess of 
$1 billion). 
273. See supra text accompanying notes 113–114 (providing examples of other 
active investors likely to encounter opportunity-cost conflicts). 
274. Eisenberg, supra note 175, at 467–68. 
